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THE NEW MASS TORTS BARGAIN
Samir D. Parikh*
Mass torts create a unique scale of harm and liabilities. Corporate
tortfeasors are desperate to settle claims but condition settlement on the
resolution of substantially all claims at a known price—commonly referred
to as a global settlement. Without this, corporate tortfeasors are willing to
continue with protracted and fragmented litigation across jurisdictions.
Global settlements can be elusive in these cases. Mass torts are oftentimes
characterized by heterogeneous victim groups that include both current
victims and future victims—individuals whose harm has not yet manifested
and may not do so for years. Despite this incongruence, future-victim claims
must be aggregated as part of any global settlement. This is the tragedy of
the mass tort anticommons: without unanimity, victim groups are unable to
access settlement resources in a timely or meaningful way, but actual
coordination across the group can be impossible.
Current resolution structures have proven ill-equipped to address the
novel challenges posed by mass torts. Many cases cannot satisfy Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s (“Rule 23”) requirements for class action
certification because of too many individual issues surrounding causation
and damages. Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is the most frequently invoked
resolution structure, but the MDL process has infirmities. MDL lacks many
of Rule 23’s fundamental safeguards that protect process integrity and victim
autonomy. MDL has become a captive settlement process. In response, a
new strategy for resolving modern mass torts has emerged. Corporate
defendants—including 3M, Johnson & Johnson, and Purdue Pharma—have
turned to bankruptcy. These mass restructurings automatically halt the
affected MDL cases and transfer proceedings to a bankruptcy court, a
process I describe as “bankruptcy preemption.” Unfortunately, bankruptcy
preemption replaces one deficient structure with another.
Mass
restructuring debtors are exploiting statutory gaps in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code in order to bind victims through an unpredictable, ad hoc structure.

* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; sparikh@lclark.edu. For helpful comments
and conversations, I am grateful to Douglas Baird, Ronit Berkovich, Andrew Bradt, Sergio
Campos, Zachary Clopton, Matt Donohue, Robert Klonoff, Charles Paternoster, Mark Roe,
Michael Simkovic, and David Skeel. Chris Bolte and Elizabeth Stowe provided superb
research assistance. Finally, I thank my family for their unwavering support. This Essay was
prepared for the Symposium entitled Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate
Litigation and Bankruptcy, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on February 25, 2022, at
Fordham University School of Law.
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The new bargain creates myriad risks, including insolvent settlement trusts
and disparate treatment across victim classes.
This Essay is the first to attempt a reconceptualization of how modern
mass torts should be resolved and delivers an unprecedented normative
construct focused on addressing anticommons dynamics through statutory
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. These changes, coupled with an
evolved perspective on fundamental structural anomalies, are designed to
improve predictability, efficiency, and victim recoveries.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Cicely Saunders’s patients were hopelessly addicted to morphine. She
prescribed the drug without hesitation and escalated doses on a
predetermined schedule often independent of patient input. But rather than
being vilified, Saunders was revered. As the mother of the modern hospice
movement in 1960s London, her attention to pain management for dying
cancer patients was revolutionary.1 Her primary objective was to prevent
suffering in a patient’s final days. The threat of addiction was irrelevant. In
fact, by 1970, Saunders was seeking an even more potent morphine drug.2
Saunders approached Napp Pharmaceuticals—a subsidiary of the U.S.
corporation Purdue Pharma—with the idea of an intensified, slow-release
morphine pill.3 Such a pill would alleviate pain in end-of-life scenarios and
ensure a constant release of morphine to allow cancer patients to enjoy
uninterrupted sleep at night. In 1981, Napp brought a medication called MS
Contin to market, and it quickly became the gold standard for managing
cancer patients’ pain.4 Saunders rejoiced. Unfortunately, the unintended
consequences of her simple request were cataclysmic.
In the late 1990s, cancer care represented a miniscule part of the
prescription drug market,5 and profits from MS Contin were negligible.6
Purdue Pharma wanted more. But there was little possibility of expanding
the patient demographic for MS Contin.7 Morphine was seen as a wildly
addictive and potent drug reserved for terminal patients.8 Purdue needed to
change the narrative.

1. See CHRIS MCGREAL, AMERICAN OVERDOSE 20 (2018).
2. See Christopher Glazek, The Secretive Family Making Billions from the Opioid Crisis,
ESQUIRE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12775932/sackler-familyoxycontin/ [https://perma.cc/4SPY-ERTZ].
3. See id.
4. See id.; see also MCGREAL, supra note 1, at 27.
5. See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph,
Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009) (in the late twentieth century,
“the non-cancer-related pain market constituted 86% of the total opioid market”).
6. Prior to its foray into prescription narcotics, Purdue was a relatively small
pharmaceutical company specializing in low-margin products, including earwax remover,
laxatives, and antiseptics. See Glazek, supra note 2.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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Purdue identified medical professionals proselytizing aggressive pain
management for all patients, not just those with cancer.9 Saunders’s system
of escalating morphine doses appeared to be transformative. Could the
system help individuals manage general chronic pain? Seizing on this
question, Purdue undertook an inventive and depraved strategy. Instead of
promoting a morphine pill like MS Contin, the company pivoted and decided
to formulate pain medication containing oxycodone, a drug that is
approximately 50 percent more potent than morphine, but with generally
misunderstood effects.10 Purdue’s field research indicated that physicians
failed to appreciate oxycodone’s addiction gravity.11 The drug had not been
stigmatized at that time.12 Further, many physicians referred to the drug as
“oxycodeine”—an unfortunate malapropism that conjured images of
codeine, a ubiquitous drug with limited addictive properties used for
moderate pain.13
By 1990, the medical profession was adjusting its view of pain
management,14 and Purdue stepped into this shifting landscape to offer the
best pain medication ever created. In 1996, Purdue brought OxyContin to
market, and prescriptions for the drug during that first year exceeded
300,000.15 A staggering six million OxyContin prescriptions were written in
2001.16 Sales topped one billion dollars for that year alone.17 By 2004,
OxyContin was the most prevalent prescription opioid abused in the United
States.18 And just four years later, Americans—who represent less than 5
percent of the world’s population—were consuming more than 80 percent of
the world’s opioids.19
Purdue did not create the pain management movement; the company just
monetized it better than anyone else. But the oversized profits the company
9. See id. Dr. Lynn Webster was part of a cohort that challenged the medical profession’s
aversion to potent and potentially addictive drugs for pain management. He now regrets his
involvement, stating recently: “We thought we could restore the life of these people who are
suffering . . . . Clearly, if I had an inkling of what I know now then, I wouldn’t have spoken
in the way that I spoke.” See MCGREAL, supra note 1, at 26.
10. See Glazek, supra note 2.
11. See id.
12. See id.; see also MCGREAL, supra note 1, at 27 (“Oxycodone was a strange beast.
While the public had heard of morphine and tended to have views about it, oxycodone was far
less well known.”).
13. See MCGREAL, supra note 1, at 27.
14. See Bethany McLean, “We Didn’t Cause the Crisis”: David Sackler Pleads His Case
on the Opioid Epidemic, VANITY FAIR (June 19, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/
2019/06/david-sackler-pleads-his-case-on-the-opioid-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/2UDNRJKQ].
15. See Glazek, supra note 2.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See McLean, supra note 14.
19. See id. On August 18, 2020, the state of New York asserted that Purdue had caused
almost $2.16 trillion in damages to various institutions and individuals throughout the United
States. See Emily Field, Purdue and Sacklers Caused $2.16T in Damage, NY Says, LAW360
(Aug. 18, 2020, 4:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1302015/purdue-and-sacklerscaused-2-16t-in-damage-ny-says [https://perma.cc/4WB2-Y4JC].
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enjoyed were not merely first-mover premiums. Purdue created a sales
strategy that suppressed the drug’s addition risks.20 Instead of targeting
physicians who exclusively treated cancer patients, the company moved the
drug into the mainstream by soliciting general practitioners, dentists,
gynecologists, and physical therapists.21 To ensure profits, the company
provided kickbacks to each cog in the distribution chain: wholesalers
received rebates in exchange for keeping OxyContin off prior-authorization
lists, pharmacists received kickbacks on their initial orders, patients received
coupons for thirty-day starter kits, medical academics received grants for
research on the benefits of pain management, and politicians received
donations from the company and its founding family. 22 Numerous other
companies would replicate these tactics to promote their own
pharmaceuticals, but Purdue was the alpha.
Purdue’s conduct is not necessarily unique. Myriad businesses and
institutions have obfuscated the harmful effects of consumer products and
actively suppressed evidence of gross transgressions. The conduct and
resultant harm have been described as mass torts. The sheer volume of
claims and potential liabilities represent an existential threat to corporate
tortfeasors. Defendants are anxious to resolve these cases, but there is an
obstacle. Defendants demand global settlements—a term describing
resolution of substantially all outstanding current and future claims at a
known price.23 Without a global settlement, corporate tortfeasors are willing
to continue with protracted and fragmented litigation, in effect denying the
victims’ collective access to the settlement funds, or, at the very least,
delaying access for an unacceptable period of time.24
The global-settlement imperative amplifies resolution complexity. Many
mass torts involve latent harm25 and are characterized by heterogeneous
victim groups.26 One stratum includes current victims—those who have
been affected by the defendant’s tortious conduct and already exhibit harm.
In many cases, there is a second stratum that includes future victims—those
20. See Glazek, supra note 2.
21. See id.
22. See id.; McLean, supra note 14.
23. See Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 941, 962 (1995).
24. See id. at 956.
25. Latent harm arises in situations where exposure to tortious conduct creates harm that
will be realized at various points along an extended continuum. For example, exposure to
asbestos fibers leads to a significantly higher risk of cancer. See Michael D. Green, D. Michal
Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 348–49 (2d ed. 2000). But asbestos has a latency
period of up to forty years. See id. Consequently, individuals exposed to asbestos fiber who
develop cancer can see that development occur at any point forty years after exposure. See id.
Some individuals may not even realize that they were exposed to asbestos fibers until many
years later.
26. See Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class:
A Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73,
76 n.3 (2020) (“Classes may be characterized by heterogeneity along axes other than claim
value . . . .”).
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who have been affected by the defendant’s tortious conduct but may not
exhibit harm for years or decades. Individuals exposed to asbestos present a
good example of this phenomenon, but the dynamic exists in many other
cases.27 Further complicating resolution is that some future victims are
entirely unknown and unknowing, meaning that they cannot be identified by
the defendant and they themselves do not know they have been exposed to
significant tortious conduct.
These cases present unique anticommons dynamics. In an anticommons
model, a large group of individuals enjoy restricted access to a scarce
resource.28 The use is restricted because each individual in the group is
endowed with the unfettered right to exclude others from using the
resource.29 When multiple individuals hold exclusion rights, transaction
costs preclude coordination, and the resource at issue cannot be accessed.30
The resource invariably devolves over time. Modern mass tort litigation
presents this dynamic. In these cases, there is a significant number of victims
holding claims against a corporate defendant. The defendant has insurance
proceeds and other capital for settlement of those claims. Current victims
would like to consume those resources immediately. But the claims of future
victims must somehow be included to satisfy the global-settlement
imperative. Therefore, future victims unintentionally exercise exclusion
rights. Anticommons dynamics are especially deleterious in mass tort cases,
which hinge on claim aggregation. The question that emerges is how due
process can be satisfied for individuals who may be unidentifiable and may
not even know that they are victims.
The judiciary has developed structures that attempt to resolve
anticommons dynamics. Once federal courts have jurisdiction over one mass
tort case, aggregation of factually similar cases can occur through three
primary means: (1) class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”), (2) consolidation by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and transfer to a single district court, and
(3) corporate bankruptcy under title 11 of the U.S. Code.
In the late twentieth century, these options worked together to formulate
meaningful resolution avenues for the “elephantine mass of asbestos cases”31

27. See, e.g., In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 18,
2020) (future claimants exist in this case because survivors of sexual abuse often repress
memories of abuse); Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 58, 68, In re TK Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375
(Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 15, 2017) (future claimants exist in this case because defective airbags
have been installed in a number of unidentifiable vehicles and could deploy and injure a driver
at some unforeseeable, future date).
28. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 670–76 (1998); Sergio Campos, Mass Torts
and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2012) (noting how mass tort litigation
presents both commons and anticommons dynamics).
29. See Heller, supra note 28, at 673–74.
30. See id.
31. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).

2022]

THE NEW MASS TORTS BARGAIN

453

that threatened to overwhelm the judiciary.32 An asbestos defendant that
could satisfy Rule 23’s strictures was allowed to bind all victims and provide
judicial supervision. Cases unable to satisfy Rule 23’s strictures could still
be resolved through MDL, which offers captive negotiation that facilitates
out-of-court settlements.33 Finally, defendants seeking a platform with more
restructuring options could file for bankruptcy and access § 524(g) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This section aggregates all victims’ claims—
including those held by future victims—and channels those claims to a
settlement trust. In exchange for funding the trust, various parties receive
immunity through a channeling injunction.34 In order to balance this
extraordinary benefit, § 524(g) installs procedural and substantive
protections for victims and other stakeholders.
Over the last forty years, an immense canon of scholarship has emerged
exploring the resolution dynamics of mass torts. This canon’s light has been
filtered through the prism of asbestos exposure cases, the archetype that has
dominated the landscape. But modern mass tort cases rarely involve asbestos
exposure claims, and new asbestos cases are dwindling.35 Modern cases are
more likely to involve opioid abuse,36 sexual abuse involving religious
institutions,37 sexual abuse involving nonreligious institutions,38

32. By 1991, there were 115,000 asbestos claims pending in federal and state courts.
See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW 2 (1991), https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7776.html [https://perma.cc/PQ8RYNGG] (click on “PDF file”).
33. See infra Part III.B.2.
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A).
35. Over an eight-and-a-half-year period, the number of new federal cases decreased by
99 percent. 46,936 asbestos cases were filed and transferred to the asbestos MDL in 2010, but
only twenty-one cases were transferred in 2018. As of June 30, 2019, only nine cases had
been transferred. See JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL-875—IN RE:
ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. VI): CUMULATIVE TOTALS (2019),
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL875/MDL-875.jun30.2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AM5-ERLT]. Only two asbestos bankruptcy cases were filed in 2019—
the lowest number in any one year since 1996. See CROWELL & MORING LLP, CHART 1:
COMPANY NAME AND YEAR OF BANKRUPTCY FILING (CHRONOLOGICALLY) 1, 4 (2020),
https://www.crowell.com/files/list-of-asbestos-bankruptcy-cases-chronological-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4939-6FQC]. The peak in the number of asbestos bankruptcy cases was in
2002, when thirteen cases were filed. See id.; see also STEPHEN J. CARROLL, DEBORAH
HENSLER, JENNIFER GROSS, ELIZABETH M. SLOSS, MATTHIAS SCHONLAU, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE
& J. SCOTT ASHWOOD, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 110 (2005), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG162.html [https://perma.cc/4TZX-BRKL] (click on “PDF file” under “Full
Document”).
36. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio filed
Dec. 12, 2017); see also In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-bk-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
15, 2019); In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-bk-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. filed June 10,
2019).
37. See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-bk-30125 (Bankr.
D. Minn. filed Jan. 16, 2015).
38. See, e.g., In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 18,
2020) (discussing claims related to sexual abuse of Boy Scouts); In re USA Gymnastics, No.
18-bk-09108 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. filed Dec. 5, 2018) (discussing claims related to sexual abuse
of female gymnasts).
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life-threatening diseases caused by common, everyday products,39 and
environmental disasters.40
The emergence of a new strategy within the mass tort kingdom coincides
with this shift. Mass tort defendants ensnared in MDL’s captive negotiation
process have sought to alter the bargain. These tortfeasors have reclaimed
control by turning to the lone exit available. Only federal bankruptcy has the
power to free claims from MDL capture.41 In the last few years, the most
notorious defendants subject to—or facing the prospect of being subject to—
an MDL, including 3M, Johnson & Johnson, Purdue Pharma, Boy Scouts of
America, and USA Gymnastics, have escaped the MDL process by filing for
bankruptcy.42 In each case, the filing transferred the adjudication of all
claims against the entity at issue to the bankruptcy court and halted entirely
any pending MDL process. I refer to this election as “bankruptcy
preemption.” Unfortunately, bankruptcy preemption has just replaced one
deficient structure with another.43
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only to mass tort cases that
involve asbestos exposure claims. Therefore, it does not apply to the new
wave of mass restructurings. Corporate tortfeasors have identified a statutory
loophole that allows them to craft an entirely unprecedented bargain. By
filing for bankruptcy, these cases escape from the MDL process. Once in
bankruptcy, mass tort debtors fashion their own ex post, ad hoc resolution
structure by cherry-picking attractive provisions and concepts out of
§ 524(g), incorporating them into a plan of reorganization, and convincing
bankruptcy courts to enforce these provisions pursuant to their equitable
powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.44 These plans seize § 524(g)’s
benefits without being subject to its procedural and substantive restrictions.
As explored in detail herein, these “exempt plans” can create serious
39. See, e.g., In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 637 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) (dealing with
claims related to exposure to talcum powder); In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., No. 19-bk-10289
(Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 13, 2019) (same); In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp.
3d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (dealing with claims related to exposure to herbicide). In the
Roundup case, an estimated 125,000 individuals have alleged that Roundup weed killer, sold
by a subsidiary of the global behemoth Bayer, causes non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. See Tom
Hals, Bayer to Rethink Roundup in U.S. Residential Market After Judge Nixes $2 Bln
Settlement, REUTERS (May 27, 2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/
healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-judge-rejects-bayers-2-bln-deal-resolve-future-rounduplawsuits-2021-05-26/ [https://perma.cc/W2ZZ-L2NK]. The scientific community is split on
the question. Bayer has proposed a $10 billion settlement in the MDL proceedings, which
includes a $1.1 billion fund for future claims. See Pretrial Order No. 214, In re Roundup Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 16-md-02741 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2020), ECF No. 11182.
40. See, e.g., In re PG&E Corp., No. 19-bk-30088 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 2019)
(dealing with claims related to wildfires).
41. See infra Part III.B.3 (describing bankruptcy preemption).
42. See infra Part III.B.2.
43. A significant difference between the federal bankruptcy process and MDL is that a
bankruptcy judge can easily intervene and adjust the process to address various deficiencies;
an MDL judge does not enjoy this level of flexibility. See infra Part III.B.2.
44. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the bankruptcy court to “issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provision of this title.”
11 U.S.C. § 105.
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consequences for mass tort victims by implementing disparate treatment
across settlement classes and increasing the risk of insolvent settlement
trusts.
The Bankruptcy Code’s current deficiencies allow for a distorted bargain,
but the process also presents the possibility of an optimal resolution platform.
Bankruptcy can encapsulate a superposition45: it can layer multiple forms of
delineated relief and revenue-generating mechanisms that are particularly
impactful in mass tort cases. The potential exists to resolve mass tort claims
efficiently, generate capital for the debtor, address anticommons problems,
satisfy due process strictures, compel settlement of both federal and state
actions, and instill comprehensive injunctions. All of these benefits are
available if certain facets of the current platform can be corrected.
This Essay makes three contributions to the legal literature on mass torts,
civil procedure, and financial restructuring. Primarily, this Essay is the first
to identify the new mass torts bargain and delineate the distinguishing
characteristics and unique resolution complexities it presents.
Second, this Essay conceptualizes how these new cases should be
adjudicated and delivers an unprecedented, normative construct focused on
solving the anticommons problem through statutory amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. The changes seek to resolve issues that are encapsulated
in two spheres: The first involves the representative appointed in bankruptcy
to negotiate on behalf of future victims and attempts to minimize capture risk
and better align this representative’s interests with those of their invisible
clients. The second sphere involves an effort to amend § 524(g) to apply to
these new mass tort cases and effect a comprehensive structural redesign to
improve predictability, efficiency, and victim recoveries.
Third, mass tort legal literature has overlooked the intersection of tort
litigation and bankruptcy. This Essay attempts to engage scholars from
various disciplines to explore the divergent complexities—including
anticommons dynamics and due process concerns—presented by this species
of nonclass aggregate litigation.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I defines the pernicious mass torts
that are the subject of the Essay and shows how current resolution structures
developed in response to asbestos exposure cases. The part also explains that
modern mass torts rarely involve asbestos claims.
Part II explores how legislative failures and Rule 23 strictures have forced
most mass torts into multidistrict litigation, a distorted process that has
achieved practical results through structurally deficient means. This part
identifies how many modern mass tort cases are exiting the MDL process by
filing for bankruptcy.
Part III reveals how bankruptcy preemption is allowing mass tort
defendants to exploit statutory loopholes and fashion an ex post, ad hoc
resolution structure that seizes all of § 524(g)’s benefits but bears few of the
45. “Superposition” describes the combination of multiple distinct phenomena of the
same type so that they coexist as part of the same event; the combination oftentimes creates a
material enhancement.
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burdens. There are many consequences, including insolvent settlement trusts
that leave future victims without recovery for serious injuries.
Part IV explores the possibility of a bankruptcy superposition—the idea
that targeted statutory modifications can yield a significantly enhanced
resolution structure. The part presents my normative construct and
illuminates how key substantive objectives can be furthered by focusing on
two core spheres: (1) addressing disparate treatment of similarly situated
victims by minimizing the systemic failures in the process for selecting a
representative for future claimants and (2) amending § 524(g) to offer
resolution options and impose restrictions on all mass tort cases.
Mass tort canon explores a bygone era of aggregate litigation. Emergence
of a unique resolution strategy for mass torts has been underappreciated. This
Essay is not only the first to identify this shift and the threats the new bargain
poses, but also to present a comprehensive statutory revision to secure
alignment between the need to efficiently resolve mass tort disputes and the
ideal of protecting victims’ rights. More broadly, I attempt to animate
scholarly debate around this vital litigation area that is in the midst of an
evolution.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE MASS TORT UNIVERSE
The term “mass tort” includes a panoply of idiosyncratic events
distinguished by the type of conduct involved and scale of harm inflicted.
Transgressions can be organized into one of five categories, with each
category presenting unique dimensions based on case facts, causation, harm
inflicted, and latency risk. The first four categories are (1) mass disasters,46
(2) simple property damage mass torts,47 (3) economic loss mass torts,48 and

46. Mass disasters are localized, single-incident transgressions that harm an identifiable
group of individuals. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
16–18 (1995); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT xii
(2007); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass
Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 165–66 (2004). A wide swath
of victims suffers significant personal injury. Causation is rarely disputed, and harm is not
temporally dispersed.
47. Some mass torts result from a single defective product or a series of similar defective
products. The product may harm the end user, but, in many cases, the claimant seeks
replacement or repair of the defective product. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 59; Anne E.
Cohen, Mass Tort Litigation After Amchem, SC57 ALI-ABA 269, 276 (1998).
48. Economic loss torts arise in unique situations where individuals have suffered
economic loss due to misconduct, but there is no accompanying physical injury or property
damage. The typical example offered for this type of mass tort involves latent product defect
cases. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 58–59 (economic loss claims based
on the theory that the Takata airbag recall reduced the market value of affected vehicles).
Another example involves the quixotic Elon Musk. On August 7, 2019, Elon Musk tweeted
that he was considering purchasing all the outstanding shares of Tesla, Inc. at $420 per share.
The stock price spiked after the announcement but then plummeted after Musk acknowledged
that he had not undertaken the necessary diligence to assess if the proposal was even possible.
Investor actions followed and were consolidated in the Northern District of California. See
generally In re Tesla, Inc. Sec. Litig., 477 F. Supp. 3d 903 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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(4) limited personal injury mass torts without latent injury;49 none of the
cases that fall into these categories are within this Essay’s purview. Complex
personal injury mass torts represent the final category and present the most
pernicious mass tort quandaries, making them this Essay’s focus.
A. General Characteristics of Complex Personal Injury Mass Torts
Complex personal injury mass torts50 disorient private, legislative, and
judicial resolution structures because of their scale, temporal dispersion,
latent harm, and causation dilemmas. Victims of mass torts suffer significant
physical, psychological, and emotional injuries. The number of victims
affected is considerable. This dynamic creates geographic dispersion.
Further, unlike mass disasters, victims’ exposure to the tortious conduct at
issue is temporally scattered across a broad timeline. For example, in the
Takata airbag case, the installation of defective airbags in popular
automobiles was the primary tortious conduct.51 The nature of the tort
precluded prompt identification; injuries and deaths were initially attributed
to the vehicular collision at issue, not the defective airbag.52 The first victim
was identified in 2004, but a meaningful recall did not occur until 2014.53
And a defective Takata airbag killed an individual just a few years ago.54
Temporal dispersion is amplified by another factor. In many mass tort
cases, multiple victims are exposed to tortious conduct, but the manifestation
of harm occurs randomly over an extended period. For example, asbestos
presents particularly vexing latency issues. A group of individuals who are
exposed to asbestos have a significantly higher risk of contracting cancer than
a comparable group that has not been exposed to the toxin.55 But, as
Professor Richard A. Nagareda explained, the exposed individuals “stand as
players in a macabre lottery.”56 For most victims, the disease will emerge at
different stages of their lives over the course of forty years.57 Others may
49. Limited personal injury mass torts capture negligent transgressions that involve
repeated actions or widely disseminated products, both of which create either minor personal
injury on a large scale or significant personal injury on a relatively small scale. See generally
NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at viii.
50. I do not attempt to formulate a list of features that apply to all mass tort cases. This
part focuses on key features of many mass tort cases, with particular emphasis on the profile
of modern mass tort cases that have sought bankruptcy protection.
51. See Sean McLain & Mike Spector, With 54 Million to Go, This Airbag Recall Is Never
Going to End, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptair-bag-maker-takata-means-to-keep-limping-along-1498477869 [https://perma.cc/3WB9MMPA].
52. See id.
53. See Timeline: Takata Air Bag Recalls, REUTERS (May 19, 2019, 10:49 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-takata-takata/timeline-takata-air-bag-recallsidUSKBN0O42QX20150520 [https://perma.cc/7PXU-KRA2].
54. See Tom Krisher, Arizona Man Killed by Exploding Takata Airbag in Honda Civic
Brings Death Toll to 24, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2019, 10:34 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/cars/2019/03/29/takata-airbag-death-exploding-bag-arizona-crash/3317448002/
[https://perma.cc/WJ5H-E7E7] (describing the death that occurred on June 11, 2018).
55. See Green et al., supra note 25, at 348–49.
56. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at xii.
57. See id.

458

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

experience absolutely no harm from their exposure.58 This is the latency
problem that plagues this type of mass tort: there can be a considerable time
gap between exposure to tortious conduct and manifestation of harm.
For many of these mass torts, the long trail of harm creates a new type of
victim and stratification in the victim class. These mass torts have traditional
victims who suffer immediate harm due to the corporate tortfeasor’s conduct.
However, in addition to this group, there are individuals—referred to as
future victims—who have been affected by the defendant’s tortious conduct,
but for whom harm will not manifest until some undetermined future point.
Some of these future victims do not even know they have been exposed to
tortious conduct; they cannot come forward themselves nor be identified by
plaintiffs’ attorneys. These unknown future victims cause further resolution
complexity.
The interests and preferences of future victims do not align with current
victims, which is one reason why class aggregation under Rule 23 is
oftentimes unavailable. Traditional means of notice are infeasible, because
these individuals do not identify as tort victims and cannot be identified by
the corporate tortfeasor. As detailed in Part II, this stratification within the
victim class complicates claim aggregation, a necessary prerequisite for
resolution of mass torts.
Causation can also be extremely difficult to establish for mass tort
victims.59 Long latency periods allow for other variables to intervene in the
causal chain.60 This is further exacerbated when an individual suffers an
injury that is fairly common in the general population.61 Imagine an
individual who was exposed to asbestos fibers in their early twenties. After
a lifetime of smoking cigarettes, this individual develops lung cancer in their
sixties. Is this illness the result of asbestos exposure or years of cigarette
smoking? Further, the effect of certain tortious conduct is difficult to
understand.62
Scientific studies may reach diametrically opposed
conclusions and mass tort cases frequently involve conflicting and
speculative expert witness testimony.63 For example, various studies
indicate that a woman’s use of talcum powder on her body does not increase

58. See id.
59. The mere possibility of a particular product or action causing the victim’s harm is
legally insufficient; generally, a direct, or proximate, causal relationship between the corporate
tortfeasor’s product or conduct and the victim’s harm is necessary. See, e.g., Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 82 n.8 (1990).
60. See Philip J. Harter, The Dilemma of Causation in Toxic Torts i–ii (Inst. for Health
Pol’y Analysis, Selective Stud. of Health Pol’y Issues Monograph No. 101, 1985); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 856 (1984).
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See generally Paul Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problems of the Indeterminate
Plaintiff, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 369 (1986).
63. See, e.g., Devra Lee Davis, The “Shotgun Wedding” of Science and Law: Risk
Assessment and Judicial Review, 10 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 67 (1985); see also Wendy E.
Wagner, Ethyl: Bridging the Science-Law Divide, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1996).
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the risk of ovarian cancer,64 but there is currently a lack of consensus in the
scientific community.65 This schism has led to a number of jury verdicts
against Johnson & Johnson66 and drove the company’s talc subsidiary and
Imerys—Johnson & Johnson’s primary talc supplier—into bankruptcy.67
Historically, the legal bases and scientific validity of the claims at issue in
most mass tort cases were not resolved until many years after the cases
settled.68 The reason for this is that the sheer volume of claims demands
prompt resolution, merit notwithstanding.69

64. See Patti Neighmond, Study Finds Talcum Powder Not Likely A Risk for Ovarian
Cancer, NPR (Jan. 7, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2020/01/07/794386909/study-finds-talcum-powder-not-likely-a-risk-for-ovarian-cancer
[https://perma.cc/NY2K-T3CF] (explaining that a study of more than 250,000 women found
no significant link between the use of talcum powder in the genital area and risk of ovarian
cancer among women).
65. See generally Nicole M. Fletcher, Amy K. Harper, Ira Memaj, Rong Fan, Robert T.
Morris & Ghassan M. Saed, Molecular Basis Supporting the Association of Talcum Powder
Use with Increased Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 26 REPROD. SCIS. 1603 (2019) (study confirming
the cellular effects of talc and providing support for previous reports linking use in the genital
area to increased ovarian cancer risk).
66. See Joel Currier, Talc Cancer Verdict of $4.6 Billion from St. Louis Jury Sends “Very
Powerful Message,” ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 13, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/talc-cancer-verdict-of-4-6-billion-from-st-louis-jury-sendsvery-powerful-message/article_c15e7f98-fce0-5a74-80ee-45371d5e98b1.html
[https://perma.cc/A9VM-THHE]; Charles Toutant, After $750 Million Award in Talc Lawsuit,
Johnson & Johnson Seeks New Punitive Damages Trial, LAW.COM (April 22, 2020, 5:15 PM),
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2020/04/22/after-750-million-award-in-talc-lawsuitjohnson-johnson-seeks-new-punitive-damages-trial/?slreturn=20220607194517
[https://perma.cc/6SMH-DHNV].
67. Over 30,000 plaintiffs have talcum powder suits pending against Johnson & Johnson,
which has a market capitalization of over $400 billion. See Mike Spector, Jessica DiNapoli &
Dan Levine, J&J Exploring Putting Talc Liabilities into Bankruptcy, REUTERS (July 19,
2021, 6:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/exclusivejj-exploring-putting-talc-liabilities-into-bankruptcy-sources-2021-07-18/ [https://perma.cc/
3KKZ-WPMT]. Johnson & Johnson has won some of these suits but faces staggering damage
awards in the cases it has lost. See Peter Loftus, Missouri Court Cuts Talc-Powder Verdict
Against J&J to $2.1 Billion, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/missouri-court-cuts-talc-powder-verdict-against-j-j-11592935876 [https://perma.cc/
8YDP-NAM4]. On May 19, 2020, the company announced that it was discontinuing the sale
of all talc-based baby powder in the United States. In October 2021, Johnson & Johnson
executed a “divisive merger”—an extremely obscure maneuver that allowed for the isolation
of all liability related to its talcum powder business in a new subsidiary called LTL
Management. See Samir D. Parikh, Mass Exploitation, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 58
(2022). On October 14, 2021, LTL Management filed for bankruptcy. The other parts of the
J&J empire stayed out of the process. See Rick Archer, Johnson & Johnson Puts Talc-Spinoff
into Ch. 11, LAW360 (Oct. 14, 2021, 6:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1431315/
johnson-johnson-puts-talc-spinoff-into-ch-11 [https://perma.cc/EAQ5-RY5P]; Jonathan
Randles, Becky Yerak & Andrew Scurria, How Bankruptcy Could Help Johnson & Johnson
Corral Vast Talc Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howbankruptcy-could-help-johnson-johnson-corral-vast-talc-litigation-11626773400
[https://perma.cc/9QHW-AZMB].
68. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 43.
69. See id.; see also Jef Feeley, Pharmacies Face Peril Without Opioid Settlements, Judge
Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 7. 2021, 8:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcylaw/pharmacies-face-peril-without-opioid-settlements-judge-says [https://perma.cc/6UWN-
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Resolving mass tort claims can present staggering transaction costs. The
volume of claims causes significant resolution delay and precludes
meaningful private negotiation and contracting.70 Naturally, claim resolution
is more viable if transaction costs can be reduced, but these costs cannot be
managed without aggregating fragmented and dispersed victim claims in one
forum—a result that hinges on access to some effective judicial process.
Until there is aggregation in one forum, limited resources are expended for
Pyrrhic victories that fail to move the war closer to resolution. Some
structure is necessary to address the “inability of the private market to
overcome the transactional barrier to the prosecution” of mass tort claims.71
B. Mass Tort Anticommons and the Global-Settlement Imperative
The final distinguishing feature of mass torts is the unique anticommons
problem they present. The tragedy of the commons is a well-known
theoretical model.72 The tragedy arises when a group of individuals have
ostensibly unfettered privileges to use a scarce resource. No single individual
in the group is allowed to exclude another from using the resource, nor can
the group coordinate efforts to restrict access to the resource.73 Each
individual benefits directly from consumption and this benefit is greater than
the delayed harm stemming from depletion risk, which is distributed evenly
among the group.74 Consequently, the individuals in the group do not
internalize all the costs of their conduct. The tragedy is that “the total of
resource units withdrawn from the resource will be greater than the optimal
economic level of withdrawal.”75 In other words, each individual acting
rationally in their own self-interest will create collective action that results in
the overconsumption—and, in many cases, the entire depletion—of the
scarce resource.76
Anticommons theory is the lesser-known sister model that presents the
converse situation. In this model, a large group of individuals enjoys
restricted access to a scarce resource.77 The use is restricted because each
individual in the group is endowed with the unfettered right to exclude others
X3RA] (explaining that even if claims against pharmacies lack a legal basis for liability, the
idea that these defendants would try hundreds of cases all over the country is unrealistic).
70. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
212–13.
71. See id. at 212.
72. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1990).
73. See id. Coordination obstacles oftentimes arise from excess transaction costs related
to coordination as opposed to some sort of theoretical restriction.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 3.
76. Garrett Hardin developed the archetypical example of the tragedy. Imagine a pasture
open to all animals of herders in the area. Each herder receives a direct benefit from their
animals grazing in the pasture, and the risk of animals overgrazing on the pasture and
destroying it is a delayed cost that is spread across all herders. “Each [herder] is locked into
a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit [but the resource at issue is
limited].” OSTROM, supra note 72, at 2–3.
77. See Heller, supra note 28, at 677.
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from using the resource.78 When multiple individuals hold exclusion rights,
transaction costs preclude coordination, and the resource at issue cannot be
accessed.79 Invariably, the resource devolves naturally over time.
Mass torts offer a particularly unique example of an anticommons
dynamic. There are a significant number of claims seeking compensation
from a limited pool of settlement funds. Current victims—many of whom
are suffering life-threatening illnesses—would like to consume these
resources immediately. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have devoted significant
resources to identifying and marshalling these victims. Consequently,
current victims are able to coordinate and negotiate a mechanism that allows
them to access promptly the trust fund resources. But there is a problem.
Corporate tortfeasors are interested in resolving mass tort claims that
represent an existential threat to their businesses, even if the merits of the
claims are suspect. However, corporate tortfeasors demand global
settlements—a term describing resolution of substantially all outstanding
current and future claims at a known price.80 Without a global settlement,
corporate tortfeasors are willing to continue with fragmented and protracted
litigation, in effect denying the victims collective access to the settlement
funds, or, at the very least, delaying access for an unacceptable period of
time.81
The global-settlement imperative exists because corporate tortfeasors are
exposed to a destabilizing degree of uncertainty without a settlement that
binds all current and future victims. More specifically, a settlement that
allows certain defendants to “opt out” or carves out future victims creates the
risk of material unaddressed claims.82 Such a settlement has significantly
diminished value.83 Indeed, victims with high-value claims will invariably
opt out of the settlement in order to keep their recovery from being diluted in

78. See id.; see also Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the Red Queen
Phenomenon, 58 B.C. L. REV. 599, 628–29 (2017) (describing how the small pool of sovereign
bonds in the 1970s required bondholder unanimity as a prerequisite to debt impairment).
79. See Heller, supra note 28, at 670–76.
80. See Schuck, supra note 23, at 962.
81. For example, in the Vioxx products liability litigation, Vioxx proposed a generous
settlement of $4.85 billion to eligible claimants, but plaintiffs’ counsel was required to secure
consent of 100 percent of their clients; further, the settlement was void if less than 85 percent
of all federal and state plaintiffs joined the settlement. See Alex Berenson, Merck Agrees to
Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/09/business/09merck.html [https://perma.cc/E8AM-M3MV].
82. See McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 26, at 78.
83. See id.; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1555 (2004). The settlement in the fen-phen dietary supplement case failed due to
multiple plaintiffs utilizing opt-out rights. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 146–47. Further,
the risk of victims exercising opt-out rights in mass tort cases is much higher than in traditional
class action cases. In traditional class action cases, the value of an individual victim’s claim
is less than the transaction costs necessary to adjudicate the claim. These victims benefit from
class aggregation, which creates the scale necessary to pursue meaningful recovery. In mass
tort cases, many victims hold extremely high-value claims and do not necessarily benefit from
aggregation.
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the general pool.84 Further, future victims can emerge at any time and in
unknown numbers, decimating otherwise profitable industries as they did for
countless asbestos companies.85 Lingering uncertainty creates a black cloud.
The cloud suppresses market capitalization, because investors are forced to
discount valuation of the corporate entity to account for the possibility that
unaddressed claims will emerge and destroy. Credit markets are affected
similarly, but the results are increased borrowing costs or—in the doomsday
scenario—restricted access to credit. Corporate tortfeasors refuse to accept
the possibility of either outcome.
Returning to the anticommons dynamic, we can see that corporate
tortfeasors—as well as insurers, affiliated corporate entities, and other parties
funding the settlement trust—invariably require substantially all victims to
agree to specific disbursement terms before any one victim can access
settlement funds. This edict gives individual victims unfettered exclusion
power. The latency quandary adds further complexity. Many mass torts have
future victims whose claims must be resolved as part of a global settlement,
but for whom harm has not yet manifested. Current victims may be able to
coordinate and negotiate a mechanism that allows them to access the trust
fund resources, but future victims must be brought along. Modern mass torts
present a unique obstacle that transcends traditional transaction cost issues.
Further, some of the victims whose votes are necessary for securing
unanimity are truly unknown, even to themselves. Coordination among
members of this class is impossible, which can preclude—or at least greatly
delay—access to settlement funds.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF MASS TORTS
The factual scenarios in mass tort cases form a rich tapestry. Cases involve
wartime herbicides,86 defective medical devices,87 countless pharmaceutical

84. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 83, at 1555.
85. By 2007 “‘nearly all of the major [asbestos] manufacturers’ ha[d] declared
bankruptcy.” LLOYD DIXON, GEOFFREY MCGOVERN & AMY COOMBE, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON
THE LARGEST TRUSTS 3 (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR872.html
[https://perma.cc/2DQY-Y4E9] (click on “PDF file” under “Full Document”) (quoting AM.
ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS ISSUES AND TRENDS 5 (2007)).
86. Agent Orange was a powerful herbicide used by U.S. military forces during the
Vietnam War, affecting millions of veterans. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 3–4 (1986).
87. The Dalkon Shield case involved a defective intrauterine birth-control device that
caused pelvic infections, sterility, involuntary abortion, and death in thousands of women. See
Karen Kenney, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dalkon Shield Gives Birth to a Generation of Lawsuits,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1985, 12:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-198504-30-8501260779-story.html [https://perma.cc/78N7-RZ5C].
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cases involving staggering side effects,88 severe personal injuries,89 and
products-liability disputes.90 But cases involving asbestos exposure have
cast a long shadow across the landscape.91
For centuries, asbestos was regarded as a type of miracle mineral because
it could “withstand punishing forces of fire, corrosion, and acid, while also
[being] versatile enough to weave into textiles and line automobile brakes,
retard shipboard fires, and bind rockets together.”92 In the 1960s, Dr. Irving
Selikoff substantiated the harmful effects of asbestos inhalation.93 The
widespread use of asbestos ceased shortly thereafter, but the contagion had
already spread: countless individuals had been directly exposed to asbestos
fibers.94 A series of isolated cases emerged in the early 1980s, but the filings
accelerated quickly. By 1991, there were 115,000 asbestos claims pending
in federal and state courts.95 The “elephantine mass of asbestos cases”96
threatened to overwhelm the judiciary.
88. DES—or diethylstilbestrol—is a synthetic estrogen that was approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration for the prevention of early miscarriage. During a twenty-year
period starting in 1948, between three and four million women ingested DES in the United
States. Unfortunately, female children of mothers who had ingested the drug “develop[ed]
preneoplastic vaginal and cervical changes in adolescence or adulthood.” HAN W. CHOI & JAE
HONG LEE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 694 (3d ed. 2011).
89. In In re National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, former
players in the National Football League brought suits alleging that the league and executive
members “concealed [the risks of head injuries] from the players.” 301 F.R.D. 191, 195 (E.D.
Pa. 2014).
90. In 1962, Dow Corning began marketing silicone breast implants that consisted of a
small silicone bag containing silicone gel. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE
CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 39 (1996). A small
percentage of the implants would rupture, and the gel could migrate through an individual’s
body, but Dow Corning did not believe that the gel posed any risk of harm. See id. at 39–43.
In the 1990s, a wave of litigation brought substantial jury verdicts, even though studies failed
to show any link between the implants and an increased risk of cancer. See David E. Bernstein,
The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 457, 477–84 (1999). By the late 1990s, implant
manufacturers were winning 80 percent of the cases that reached a verdict. See id. at 493
n.177. Nevertheless, in May 1995, Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy protection and
structured a $3.2 billion trust to settle tens of thousands of claims. Jeff Leeds, Dow Corning
Agrees to Pay $3.2 Billion in Breast Implant Case, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1998, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-nov-10-fi-41095-story.html
[https://perma.cc/HA5S-S332]. The bulk of silicone implant litigation was bereft of scientific
evidence. See Bernstein, supra, at 477–84. In 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
lifted the ban on silicone gel implants. See ANGELL, supra, at 44.
91. I acknowledge that asbestos cases are not the only type of personal injury mass tort,
but these cases have eclipsed all others. Indeed, asbestos exposure cases have dominated this
area and collectively represent the “longest-running mass tort litigation in the United States.”
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 35, at 21. The tragedy has spurred an enormous canon of
academic literature, countless studies, and exhaustive legislative and procedural changes. See
HENSLER, supra note 32, at 7–8 (“Over the past half-dozen years, there has probably been
more procedural innovation associated with asbestos litigation in federal and state courts than
in any other single area of litigation.”).
92. Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis,
30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 387 (1993).
93. See id. at 390.
94. See id. at 389 n.9.
95. See HENSLER, supra note 32, at 3.
96. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
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The Judicial Conference of the United States established the Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation to analyze the situation and propose
solutions. The committee’s 1991 report concluded that the “situation ha[d]
reached critical dimensions and . . . the courts [were] ill-equipped to [handle
this disaster].”97 The committee recommended a “national solution”
premised on congressional action creating a single forum for all federal and
state court asbestos cases.98 But the prospect of congressional intervention
was dim.
In 1991, eight district judges petitioned the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) to consolidate all asbestos cases in a single judicial
district.99 On July 29, 1991, under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the panel created
MDL 875 and transferred all 26,000 pending federal cases to Judge Charles
R. Weiner for pretrial management.100 MDL 875 has been in existence for
almost thirty years and is the largest MDL in U.S. history.101
Asbestos cases present particularly complex latency issues and intriguing
financial, procedural, and constitutional dynamics that have impacted various
generations across the country. This litigation beast has fascinated and
terrified policy makers and jurists. The expectation is that asbestos litigation
will ultimately total over one million claims costing defendants and insurers
over $265 billion.102 The canon of mass tort scholarship is dominated by
academic literature chronicling the asbestos litigation epidemic, diagnosing
resolution defects and proposing structural, statutory, and jurisprudential
modifications to tame the beast.
Asbestos exposure cases consumed the judiciary and produced a bespoke
resolution structure. But the asbestos imprint has faded over time. Modern
mass tort litigation rarely involves asbestos claims.103 In fact, by 2007,
“‘nearly all of the major [asbestos] manufacturers’ ha[d] declared
bankruptcy.”104
A new species of mass tort litigation has evolved over the last ten years.
Numerous modern cases capture this shift, including those involving the

97. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION
2 (1991).
98. See id. at 3.
99. See Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 111–12 (2013).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 100 n.4 (stating that MDL 875 is the largest MDL in U.S. history in terms
of number of claims and cases transferred).
102. See id. at 105.
103. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
104. DIXON ET AL., supra note 85, at 3 (quoting AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF
ASBESTOS CLAIMS ISSUES AND TRENDS 5 (2007)).
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opioid crisis,105 sexual abuse involving nonreligious entities,106 and product
defects with significant latent injury risks.107 These new cases do not present
identical resolution obstacles, but they do highlight new strategies and
105. Purdue Pharma and Insys Therapeutics are just two examples. These manufacturers
built a business model on the premise that if they could get their drugs into the hands of the
general public, patients would become hopelessly addicted. See Joe Eaton, How a Drugmaker
Bribed Doctors and Helped Fuel the Opioid Epidemic, AARP (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2019/insys-opioid-bribery-case.html
[https://perma.cc/E4VG-MQNF] (“The longer the patient stayed on the drug, the higher the
dose that they were going to use, and the more revenue it was going to be worth to us.” (quoting
former Insys CEO Michael Babich)). Executives understood the devastation that would result.
What they failed to appreciate was that the collective of depraved individuals willing to
implement this type of strategy was extremely large, and a national crisis was the inevitable
result. Societal, legal, and business pressures all aligned, and both cases quickly reached a
mature litigation stage ready for settlement. This aligned with the objective of Judge Dan A.
Polster, who oversaw the MDL and voiced a strong desire for a prompt out-of-court settlement
of these actions. See Transcript of Proceedings at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 17-CV-02804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58. Judge Polster explained, “[M]y
objective is to do something meaningful to abate this crisis and to do it [immediately] . . . .
[W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials.” Id. at 4, 9. But neither Purdue Pharma
nor Insys Therapeutics settled with the victims of their transgressions as part of the MDL.
Instead, they both filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 and exited those
proceedings. See Eaton, supra.
106. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) case demonstrates a radical new perspective on
personal accountability in sexual abuse cases. In that case, staggering numbers of children
and young adults were sexually abused by individuals working within the BSA organizations.
Further, key executives at the national and local chapters were aware and refused to report the
abuses, choosing to protect abusers from law enforcement and other organizations. BSA held
records detailing abuse from as early as 1919. See Nina Feldman & Nicholas Pugliese, New
Lawsuit Reveals More Sexual Abuse Allegations Against Boy Scouts of America, NPR (Aug.
7, 2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/749041591/new-lawsuit-reveals-moresexual-abuse-allegations-against-boy-scouts-of-america
[https://perma.cc/7DUT-PU93].
BSA’s plan of reorganization calls for the creation of a settlement trust funded by BSA cash
and insurance proceeds, to which all victims’ claims will be channeled. See Disclosure
Statement for the Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Boy Scouts of America and Delaware
SBA, LLC at 23–24, In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 18, 2020),
ECF No. 21.
107. Consumer products with significant latent injury risks continue to plague the
marketplace. Many of these products are seen as safety mechanisms designed to actually
protect end users or are innocuous products without the possibility of any negative effects.
The Takata mass tort presents an example of the former. The Japanese conglomerate
specialized in airbag systems and seat belts. See Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization of TK Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at
58–59. Unfortunately, the company installed defective airbags beginning in the early 2000s
and failed to take corrective measures until 2014. The problem is particularly pernicious
because Takata airbag systems were installed in over 40 million vehicles in the United States
alone—roughly 16 percent of the 260 million vehicles on U.S. roads. Only a fraction of the
affected vehicles have been recalled and repaired. See McLain & Spector, supra note 51. On
February 5, 2015, the JPML centralized numerous proposed class actions against Takata and
various automakers in a federal district court in Florida (the “Airbag MDL”). See In re Takata
Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2015). Shortly thereafter,
Takata determined that pursuing an asset sale in bankruptcy was its most viable option. See
generally Samir D. Parikh, Scarlet-Lettered Bankruptcy: A Public Benefit Proposal for Mass
Tort Villains, 117 NW. U. L. REV. 425 (2022) (raising doubts about this choice). After
extensive negotiations, Takata and various affiliates filed for bankruptcy on June 25, 2017,
and exited the Airbag MDL. See Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of TK Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 8.
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expose the void that currently exists in resolution structures—a void that will
be explored further in Part III.
Mass torts have evolved, but—as detailed in the following part—the only
structures available to resolve them have not.
III. RESOLUTION STRUCTURES
Professor Michael A. Heller explains that, over time, close-knit groups
may develop informal norms that help them access a resource efficiently,
while ensuring uniform resource allocation across groups with misaligned
interests.108 But mass torts do not involve close-knit groups. A more realistic
solution to the claim aggregation problem involves an aggressive legislative
response to create a structure that binds all victims even without
coordination. Unfortunately, the dream of a legislative deus ex machina109
is long dead. What remains for those seeking resolution of modern mass tort
litigation is an overreliance on the judiciary and the MDL process.
This part explores how legislative failures and Rule 23 strictures forced
many mass torts into multidistrict litigation and federal bankruptcy court for
a substantive resolution.
A. Regulatory Inaction and Legislative Failures
Regulatory agencies offer ex ante means to prevent mass torts. These
measures are extremely attractive to policy makers.110 Enhanced regulatory
oversight could theoretically keep defective products and perverse
pharmaceuticals out of public hands, as well as prevent financial and other
institutional crimes.111 For example, a more diligent U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has the capacity to limit the introduction of highly
addictive drugs into the market and restrict “off-label” prescriptions. Further,
aggressive monitoring can be impactful in many cases even without
meaningful enforcement.112
Unfortunately, regulatory agencies have failed to control excessive
corporate risk-taking.113 One reason for this deficiency is that these bodies
108. See Heller, supra note 28, at 677–78.
109. The Greek phrase “deus ex machina” translated literally means “a god from a
machine.” The phrase is often used to describe “unlikely saviors and improbable actions that
bring order out of chaos in sudden and surprising ways.” Deus ex machina,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deus%20ex%20machina
[https://perma.cc/4NVG-XT3E] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
110. See Parikh & He, supra note 78, at 601 (explaining that, as the adage states, the best
way to dismantle an atomic bomb is to not build it in the first place).
111. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 10.
112. See Samir D. Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
221, 278 (2015) (“Studies demonstrate that people modify their behavior if they believe they
are being monitored, even if the monitor cannot take any action against them.”).
113. Examples abound and stretch across various fields from pharmaceuticals, e.g., the
FDA’s failure to police opioid manufacturers over a thirty-year period, see Abby Goodnough
& Margot Sanger-Katz, As Tens of Thousands Died, F.D.A. Failed to Police Opioids, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/health/FDA-opioids.html
[https://perma.cc/V4PK-4TDF], to the financial sector, e.g., the U.S. Securities and Exchange
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do not have sufficient resources. Over the last forty years, administrations
led by individuals from both primary political parties have undertaken a
concerted effort to minimize the purview of regulatory agencies.114 Funding
for these agencies has similarly diminished over time.115 Most damning is
the fact that modern mass torts oftentimes involve intentional misconduct,
actions that present a high risk of significant civil penalties and even criminal
prosecution. Nevertheless, corporate tortfeasors in these instances behave
irrationally,116 making decisions infected by various heuristics117 and
biases.118 Unethical corporate actors with this orientation and an intention to
commit illegal acts can be policed only by aggressive internal and external
controls.119 And governmental agencies are not positioned to meet this
challenge.
Ex post legislative options are similarly limited. Under Article I of the
U.S. Constitution, Congress enjoys the power to unilaterally alter preexisting
rights through legislation.120 Professor Nagareda urged Congress to pass
legislation establishing a bespoke administrative framework for resolving
mass tort claims.121 Under Professor Nagareda’s proposal, government
officials would identify mass tort cases of a certain scale.122 Claims in those
cases would be pulled out of the tort system and managed in an administrative
process where officials would distribute private funds to victims pursuant to
a predetermined compensation matrix.123 In exchange for funding the
distribution, corporate tortfeasors would be absolved of further liability.124
The idea is attractive in theory, but past congressional attempts to fashion
an administrative resolution framework have failed. For example, in the late
Commission’s failure to discover Bernie Madoff’s fifty-year Ponzi scheme, even after
repeated whistleblower notices detailing the intricacies of the scheme, see Marcy Gordon,
How Ponzi King Bernie Madoff Conned Investors and Seduced Regulators, FORTUNE (Apr.
15, 2021, 5:41 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/04/15/how-ponzi-king-bernie-madoff-connedinvestors-and-seduced-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/KS6J-MD6D].
114. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 10.
115. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was underfunded
throughout the 2000s and chose to focus on certain financial crimes (e.g., insider trading)
while generally ignoring others (e.g., Ponzi schemes). See Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC Seeks
More Examiners, but SRO Idea Still Looming, INV. NEWS (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.investmentnews.com/sec-seeks-more-examiners-but-sro-idea-still-looming42349 [https://perma.cc/XGK4-2MJ3]. Bernie Madoff repeatedly mocked the SEC’s attempts
to detect his billion-dollar Ponzi scheme. See Robert Smith, In Recordings, Madoff Offers Tips
to Evade the SEC, NPR (Sept. 10, 2009, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=112725013 [https://perma.cc/B7Q4-A9LF].
116. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417,
417–24 (2003).
117. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 102–03 (1993).
118. See Prentice, supra note 116, at 417–24.
119. See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—and How to Fix
Them, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116, 116.
120. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 58–63.
121. See id. at 62.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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1990s, the judiciary had been unable to resolve asbestos litigation, and the
focus shifted to Congress.125 From 1998 to 2005, over fifteen bills were
introduced in Congress proposing changes to the way in which asbestos
claims are resolved.126 Almost every bill created a publicly administered
resolution structure that was privately funded.127 Asbestos manufacturers
and insurance companies, among other stakeholders, agreed to fund the trust
in exchange for being absolved of future liability.128 Despite the
overwhelming need for legislative intervention, all fifteen bills failed.
Ultimately, “[t]he significant problem with a legislative solution has . . . to
do with . . . politics . . . [and] the array of interests” that align and derail
sweeping legislative proposals.129 An ex post administrative framework is
an unlikely solution to the mass tort quandary.
An additional legislative option is the idea of using public dollars to
supplement victim compensation.130
Congress has established
administrative compensation programs in the past to address toxic torts.
Unfortunately, the results undermine the efficacy of this proposal. For
example, in 1969, Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969131 (the “Coal Mine Act”) to help coal miners suffering from
black lung disease.132 The act allowed affected miners to receive workers’
compensation benefits and distributions.133
The Coal Mine Act and its extensive amendments are considered a
disaster.134 In its 1980 report, the U.S. General Accounting Office
highlighted various problems.135 Primarily, the legislation was poorly
drafted and created a fundamentally deficient payment infrastructure.136
Further, the program was not well administered.137 The Coal Mine Act’s
legacy is that it significantly reduced the possibility that the federal
government would consider administering a mass tort compensation program
of any kind.138
125. See Robreno, supra note 99, at 114.
126. See id.
127. See Elise Gelinas, Asbestos Fraud Should Lead to Fairness: Why Congress Should
Enact the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 MD. L. REV. 162, 168–69 (2009).
128. See id.
129. Edley & Weiler, supra note 92, at 400.
130. This approach may be particularly appealing because the United States does not have
a comprehensive medical disability system, as do many developed countries.
131. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and
30 U.S.C.).
132. PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 26–28 (1987).
133. See id.
134. See Schuck, supra note 23, at 970.
135. See BARTH, supra note 132, at 262.
136. See id. at 276.
137. Id. at 284. For example, a majority of miners received large compensation awards
even when there was little medical evidence that they had black lung. See id. at 269. The
legislation was “the epitome of political manipulation of the pork barrel process, under the
guise of operating a workers’ compensation scheme.” Id. at 128.
138. See id. at 284 (“[Any program similar to the black lung program] would be an
expensive blunder.”); see also Schuck, supra note 23, at 969 n.124 (“Congress has taken one
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Legislators could do a lot to prevent mass torts or, at the very least,
effectively compensate victims. But Congress has retreated from this
challenge and ceded the space to the judiciary.
B. The Judiciary’s Current Approach
Over thirty-five years ago, Professor David Rosenberg argued that mass
tort litigation should be seen as a public-law dispute.139 Because of the type
and scale of harm suffered and the difficulty in resolving claims at an
individual-claimant level, these cases demand a collective process focused
on accelerated resolution, decreased transaction costs, some semblance of
equity across claimant classes, and more generalized causation inquiries.140
Mass tort cases are akin to public litigation involving court-ordered
restructuring used to efficiently compensate victims while protecting their
constitutional rights.141 Public interest cases—such as those involving
school desegregation—impact communities far beyond those represented by
the actual litigants.142
Mass torts are indeed a hybrid. They are customary private disputes, but
they also present a scale that transforms resolution options. These dynamics
render private and legislative ordering of these cases difficult and
misshapen.143 Consequently, the judiciary has assumed an oversized role.
As explored below, once federal courts have jurisdiction over one mass tort
case, aggregation of factually similar cases occurs through three primary
means: (1) certification of a class under Rule 23, (2) consolidation by the
JPML and transfer to a single district court, or (3) corporate bankruptcy under
title 11 of the U.S. Code.
1. Class Aggregation and Rule 23
Rule 23 offers the infrastructure that provides various options for
qualifying class actions. This process attempts to address the private
market’s inability to overcome the transactional barrier to the resolution of
voluminous private claims.144
It offers judicial supervision and
noncontractual aggregation. Class actions are designed for cases involving
common causation elements in which victims hold negative-value claims—
lesson away from its experience with the black lung program: ‘Don’t do it again.’”).
I acknowledge the relative success of the fund established to address claims for death or
personal injury related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, this fund came about as a result
of a terrorist attack that was equated to an act of war, where the victims were described as
casualties of war entitled to special consideration. See George Rutherglen, Distributing
Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 673, 678–79 (2005).
139. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 60.
140. See Troy A. McKenzie, The Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Pre-History, 5 J. TORT L. 59,
78 (2012).
141. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 40.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 204.
144. See Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 212.
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a label that applies when the value of an individual victim’s claim is less than
the transaction costs necessary to adjudicate the claim and secure that dollar
value.145 Class actions overcome the incentive deficiencies that accompany
negative-value claims “by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor”
and by securing bargaining leverage that is otherwise unavailable.146
The process has had a transformative effect on our jurisprudence. Rule 23
allows members of a class to sue as representative parties on behalf of other
victims who are similarly situated.147
The adjudication of the
representatives’ claims invariably determines the resolution of those held by
absent class members. Absent class members enjoy the right to opt out of
settlements, but few do because they invariably hold negative-value
claims.148
Rule 23 mandates that the court play an enhanced gatekeeper role. At the
entry point, the trial court will certify a class only if the suit satisfies the
criteria set forth in Rule 23(a) involving numerosity, 149 commonality,150
typicality,151 and adequacy of representation.152 If these criteria are satisfied,
the court must then determine the appropriate class type—among the three
delineated in Rule 23(b)—for the claims at issue. The vast majority of class
actions for money damages are brought under subsection (b)(3), which
requires that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting individual members.153 This subsection also
requires that class certification must be superior to other available methods
of adjudication.154

145. See McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 26, at 81; see also Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11–24
(2009).
146. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
147. See D. Brooks Smith, Class Action and Aggregate Litigation: A Comparative
International Analysis, 124 PA. ST. L. REV. 303, 308 (2019).
148. See id.
149. The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The
requisite number of cases varies based on the dispute at hand. See In re Modafinil Antitrust
Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2016).
150. Common questions of law or fact characterize the claims of class victims, and these
common questions must find resolution in common answers. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
151. The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class. See, e.g., Wiener v. Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 666–67 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
152. The representative parties (1) will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class and (2) should not have material conflicts of interest with absent class members. See,
e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855–56 (1999); see also Eubank v. Pella Corp.,
753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (overturning class settlement because lead class counsel was the
lead class representative’s son-in-law).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
154. See Smith, supra note 147, at 309. This option is also the most popular form of class
action in the United States. See id.
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Rule 23(e) allows for class certification for the sole purpose of settlement
and has become the preferred resolution option in mass tort cases.155 In these
circumstances, the trial court appoints a fiduciary for absent class members
who is tasked with protecting due process rights for all members.156 Rule 23
mandates adequate notice to the class and allows members to participate in
proceedings or opt out of any settlement and pursue litigation individually.157
Returning to its enhanced gatekeeper role, the court will not allow exit before
it assesses the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms
and the settlement process.158 In order to fulfill this obligation, courts
invariably appoint experts or other adjuncts to evaluate the settlement process
and offer an additional layer of class protection.159 Ultimately, Rule 23
creates a structural design that facilitates adjudication when necessary and
settlement when possible, while also attempting to ensure procedural and
constitutional integrity.160 After decades of legislative inaction and failure,
class aggregation was seen as perhaps the only viable option for addressing
mass tort litigation.
However, the adequacy-of-representation requirement rendered many
mass tort cases a poor fit within Rule 23’s strictures.161 Plaintiffs’ attorneys
sought a way around this obstacle. A new theory emerged in the 1980s:
instead of relying on class actions for case adjudication, the process could
facilitate resolution of mass torts by merely serving as an enforcement device
for out-of-court global settlements.162 Animated by this premise, plaintiffs’
attorneys sought settlement class certification as a means to resolve mass
torts.

155. See Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 965 (2012).
156. As explained by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, “[t]he central concern in
reviewing a proposed class-action settlement is that it be fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 112 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/2017-04-civil-agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL6U-K4PX].
157. See Smith, supra note 147, at 310.
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., Class Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement
and Certification of Class and Subclasses, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion
Inj. Litig., No. 12-md-02323 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No. 6423.
160. I do not dispute that the process is far from optimal. Rule 23’s structure and
implementation has received criticism. See Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The
Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1188–90 (2009) (acknowledging that
“class action settlement procedures are far from perfect and are often inadequate” and listing
various deficiencies). Further, the process arguably represents a type of litigation extortion
where excessive stakes coerce corporate defendants to settle claims that lack merit in order to
avoid risking the corporate entity’s survival. See Daniel Klerman, Posner and Class Actions,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1103–04 (2019).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (explaining
that mass tort cases were “ordinarily not appropriate” for class treatment because of the
difficulty in identifying class representatives that could fairly and adequately protect class
interests).
162. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 72–73.
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Many mass tort cases in the 1990s were certified and ultimately
resolved.163 It appeared that mass tort litigation had found a home.164
However, at the end of the decade, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
propriety of Rule 23 certification in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor165
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.166 and altered the landscape.
a. The Mass Tort Carve-Out
There is considerable overlap between Amchem and Ortiz. Many of the
same parties—most notably, plaintiffs’ attorneys—involved in Amchem were
involved in Ortiz, and the settlements in both cases were drafted alongside
one another despite the two-year gap in the cases’ timelines.167
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that class certification in both
cases met the same dire fate.
Amchem and Ortiz involved extensive asbestos liability and distinct
anticommons dynamics. Indeed, settlement funds were available for victims,
but defendants demanded a global settlement that would bind both current
and future victims.168 Current victims were selected as class representatives
to represent the interests of the entire victims’ class, including future
victims.169 These representatives agreed to a settlement that bound all
victims to a compensation scheme that failed to contain a meaningful opt-out
option.170 In other words, future victims were precluded from bringing
individual claims against the defendants based on the agreement made by a
group of claimants who held entirely distinct interests and incentives. In both
cases, the settlement classes failed to assure the necessary level of
cohesiveness of interests among named representative plaintiffs and future
victims.171 The class design failed to provide essential structural protections
against obvious conflicts of interest.
Individuals are generally not bound by a prior judgment unless they are a
party to the proceeding and served with process.172 Precedent allows courts
to deviate from this premise if structural safeguards ensure that a person who
failed to receive notice of the prior proceedings was adequately represented
163. Jurists admitted that the asbestos crisis necessitated judicial flexibility. See Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986). And courts took comfort in the fact that
mass tort cases were certified to exclusively pursue settlement. See McKenzie, supra note 155,
at 969.
164. See Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts
Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1697–98 (1998) (explaining that federal court
class actions became a preferred resolution device during this period). But see FED. R. CIV. P.
23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (disavowing the rule’s applicability to
mass tort cases).
165. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
166. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
167. See Chamblee, supra note 46, at 212.
168. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600–01; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 824–25.
169. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 602–03; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 825–27.
170. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 604–05; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 827.
171. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627–28; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856–57.
172. See McKenzie, supra note 155, at 977.
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in those proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected the settlement class
actions in Amchem and Ortiz because each settlement failed to provide
adequate representation. This deficiency precluded any attempt to bind
absent class members or extinguish their prospective right to sue
individually.
b. The Landscape After Amchem and Ortiz
Amchem, Ortiz, and modern case law capture the Court’s concern with
structural and procedural integrity in class aggregation.173 However, with
these decisions, the Court limited the class action resolution option for the
vast majority of mass tort cases.174 In the years since Amchem and Ortiz,
federal courts have reached a consensus: most personal injury mass torts
present too many individual issues surrounding causation and damages to
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements.175 Class
actions have dropped out of the “available set of tools for attempting to settle
most mass torts, absent some extraordinary willingness of a settling
defendant to allow some form of future claims to return to the tort system.”176
This shift has produced an odd result. By limiting the class aggregation
option, the Court—perhaps unintentionally177—pushed these cases into a
resolution framework that oftentimes fails to rigorously assess the integrity
of the process or the settlements that result.
2. MDL and Structurally Deficient Means
Amchem and Ortiz ostensibly eliminated Rule 23’s class aggregation
option for most mass tort cases.178 The rise of multidistrict litigation
reflected an effort to address this gaping void, creating practical results with
structurally deficient means.179

173. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011); see also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 747–48 (2013) (detailing the heightened burdens imposed on class
action plaintiffs in maintaining their class status).
174. See Andrew D. Bradt & Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251,
1264 (2018); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY REPORTS
ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION 4 (2004), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/amort02_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U7A-MRHW].
175. See WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 174, at 4.
176. Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 208 (footnote omitted). However, some courts have
recently been more receptive to certifying mass torts. See, e.g., Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal
Prods., 896 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2018).
177. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court suggested that the defendant Fibreboard’s best
option may be filing for bankruptcy. 527 U.S. 815, 850–51 (1999).
178. See Klonoff, supra note 173, at 745–55.
179. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 174.
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a. MDL Design
In the 1960s, electrical equipment antitrust cases threatened to overwhelm
the judiciary.180 In response, Chief Justice Earl Warren created a
coordinating committee to fashion “uniform pretrial and discovery orders,
national depositions, and central document depositories . . . .”181 This
procedural streamlining miraculously resolved these cases by 1967.182 The
promising results warranted codification. The Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968183 added § 1407 to the U.S. Judicial Code and created the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation.184 On a motion of an interested party or on its
own motion, the JPML may aggregate and transfer cases pending in federal
court to one federal district court for pretrial proceedings.185 The JPML does
not consider cases in which trial is already underway.186 The statute instructs
the JPML to determine whether (1) “one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts,” (2) transfer “will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses,” and (3) transfer “will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.”187 The statute’s flexibility is evident. The inquiry
of common questions of fact is easier to satisfy than Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement.188
Section 1407’s overriding goal is to allow one federal judge to streamline
pretrial matters that are generally procedural in nature.189 At the conclusion
of pretrial proceedings, however, the statute mandates that cases be remanded
to the districts where they were originally filed.190 The MDL court was not
intended to be a destination; it is merely a stop along the path to resolution.191

180. Blake M. Rhodes, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713 (1991).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
184. Rhodes, supra note 180, at 714 (“The Panel is empowered to transfer to any federal
district court ‘civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact . . . for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a))).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
186. See id.
187. Id. § 1407(a).
188. For example, this was the case for the opioid abuse litigation. See In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378–79 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (“All of the actions
can be expected to implicate common fact questions as to the allegedly improper marketing
and widespread diversion of prescription opiates . . . and discovery likely will be
voluminous.”).
189. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 2–3 (1968); see also S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 2 (1968).
I acknowledge that § 1407 seeks efficiency and, by extension, legislators must have
contemplated settlement disposition for cases. But there is no indication in the legislative
history that policy makers contemplated settlement entirely displacing adjudication, which is
what has materialized.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
191. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 871 (2017).
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In the last twenty years, MDLs have supplemented class actions for
personal injury mass tort cases.192 MDL’s growth has been meteoric; in
2019, 52 percent of all pending civil cases in federal court were in MDLs at
the end of the prior fiscal year.193 Mass tort dockets comprise only 23 percent
of all MDLs, but those dockets represent the consolidation of over 125,000
civil actions, or over 96 percent of all pending actions included in all of the
MDL dockets.194 Lost in these numbers and resolution primacy is the fact
that the MDL process has evolved in ways that undermine the resolution
model for many mass tort victims.195 This forced transformation explains
why the statute fails to include safeguards essential for the role into which it
has been thrust.
b. MDL Distortion
MDL has been instrumental in resolving complex cases and preserving the
viability of the judiciary in the face of potentially overwhelming case
volume.196 But the promise of procedural streamlining is a mirage that has
led parties into quicksand. “[T]he worst-kept secret in civil procedure” is
that transferred cases do not return to their transferor courts and victims do
not receive their day in court.197 As of September 30, 2018, approximately
156,511 actions were pending in front of forty-eight transferee district
courts.198 From 1968 through September 30, 2018, transferee courts had
received and resolved approximately 516,593 cases.199 Of these civil
actions, only 16,728 were remanded for trial.200 In other words, only 3
percent of transferred cases escaped MDL capture; 97 percent of transferred
cases are resolved in the MDL court by dispositive motion or settlement.201

192. See Dave Simpson, MDLs Surge to Majority of Entire Federal Civil Caseload,
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2019, 10:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1138928/mdlssurge-to-majority-of-entire-federal-civil-caseload [https://perma.cc/R6BK-CC88]; Thomas
Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate
Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV. 775, 806 (2010).
193. Simpson, supra note 192.
194. See Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, JUDICATURE, Fall 2015, at 36, 41.
195. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE
132, 155 (2015).
196. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2015).
197. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2017);
see also Samir D. Parikh, Bankruptcy Is Optimal Venue for Mass Tort Cases, LAW360
(Feb. 28, 2022, 1:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1468363/bankruptcy-is-optimalvenue-for-mass-tort-cases [https://perma.cc/9DKN-NL2C].
198. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1407 FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 3 (2018),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_
Litigation-FY-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE5Z-Q2UP].
199. See id. at 7.
200. See id. at 3.
201. See id.
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MDL should not be a captive settlement negotiation. The process should
accommodate the possibility of cases being remanded at the conclusion of
relatively accelerated pretrial proceedings.202 Instead, cases languish—
sometimes for years—as the transferee judge accommodates, cajoles, urges,
and, in many cases, compels settlement.203 Adjudication is no longer an
option, and the process predicated on efficiency has lost its way.204
For example, in In re Patenaude,205 transferred cases languished before
the MDL judge for seven years.206 Plaintiffs sought to have the cases
remanded, asserting that pretrial matters had been resolved years before.207
Their objections fell on deaf ears. The plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus to remand their cases
for trial.208 The Third Circuit denied the writ because, in its estimation,
pretrial proceedings were “ongoing,” even after seven years.209
In In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation,210 the MDL court treated
settlement as a fait accompli. At the initial hearing, Judge Dan A. Polster
stated that his sole goal was to see an immediate global settlement of the
cases.211 In fact, he stated unequivocally that trials were entirely
unnecessary, and he would consider it a failure if he allowed the matter to
proceed to litigation and adjudication.212 The shocking import of this
statement was best captured by Professor Howard M. Erichson, who noted
that “[i]t is one thing for a judge to say that abatement of [a] crisis is an
important goal . . . . It is quite another thing to forswear litigation and
adjudication altogether.”213

202. See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?: Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245,
2264–65 (2008).
203. See ROBERT KLONOFF, FEDERAL MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 243–60
(1st ed. 2020).
204. MDL 875 was commonly known as the “black hole” for asbestos litigation because
transferred cases never returned to their transferor courts and were similarly never resolved.
See Robreno, supra note 99, at 126; see also Eldon E. Fallon, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2330 (2008) (Judge Fallon, who presided over the Vioxx
MDL, admitting that the process can “resemble a ‘black hole,’ into which cases are transferred
never to be heard from again”).
205. 210 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2000).
206. Id. at 138.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 146.
210. 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
211. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 105, at 4, 9 (“People aren’t interested in
depositions, and discovery, and trials . . . . So my objective is to do something meaningful to
abate this crisis and to do it [immediately] . . . . [W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t
need trials.” (emphasis added)).
212. See id. at 5–6, 9.
213. Howard M. Erichson, MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation, 53 GA. L. REV.
1287, 1291–92 (2019).
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These tactics are not entirely unforeseeable. The statute forbids MDL
judges from adjudicating cases;214 compelling a settlement is the only means
to effectuate immediate impact. And the MDL process is infected with the
idea that settlement is a successful result under any circumstance.215
As noted above, 97 percent of MDLs are either settled or resolved through
a dispositive motion.216 And, in fact, the supermajority of mass tort litigation
is resolved through contractual settlements.217 However, this number says
nothing about the efficiency and equity of the resolution process.218 Keep in
mind that § 1407 seeks “just conduct,” but the statute fails to allow the JPML
or the transferor court to assess the fairness of settlements or even direct the
settlement process.219 In other words, there are no statutory requirements for
the MDL court to review or assess the integrity of a settlement process or any
settlement reached by the parties.220 And, in the pursuit of expediency, many
courts do not undertake such inquiries.221 Unfortunately, a structure
consumed with efficiency through procedural devices undermines just
outcomes if it lacks the ability to assure claim merit, defendant culpability,
and settlement integrity.222 Further, these settlements have a significant
practical limitation for many mass tort cases: claims of future victims—in
addition to state law claims—cannot be aggregated as part of the
settlement.223 A global settlement is unavailable for many defendants.
Consequently, high-value suits could be filed even after an MDL is
completed.224 And plaintiffs have the option of opting out of a settlement
reached by the corporate defendant and plaintiffs’ counsel.225
Victims lack control in an MDL.226 Agency principles break down in the
MDL process because the agents—plaintiffs’ attorneys—are invariably
immune from the instructions and wishes of the principals, the victims.227
214. 22 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district court from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.”).
215. See Erichson, supra note 213, at 1288, 1291–92; Chamblee, supra note 46, at 173,
221; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404
(1978).
216. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
217. See Chamblee, supra note 46, at 158.
218. See generally Erichson, supra note 213.
219. Chamblee, supra note 46, at 196.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See generally George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 559–69 (1997).
223. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769, 1775–76 (2005).
224. See Howard M. Erichson, What MDL and Class Actions Have in Common, 70 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 29, 36–37 (2017).
225. Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1715–16 (2017).
226. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Perceptions of Justice in
Multidistrict Litigation: Voice from the Crowd, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on
file with author) (manuscript at 22–33).
227. See id.
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Cases are guided by steering committees,228 and plaintiffs’ attorneys and the
MDL judge exercise absolute resolution control.229 A truly surprising facet
of the process is that victims are unable to exit.230 MDL judges are extremely
invested in these cases and have exhibited a propensity to compel settlements
that are coercive to individual plaintiffs.231
More fundamentally, the process contravenes policy objectives and fails
to deter undesirable behavior. Compelled settlements rarely consider
culpability, heightening the possibility of extortive litigation.232 Deterrence
is unrealized because there are significant lottery effects; in other words,
corporate actors that conform their behavior to legal strictures are no better
off than those that do not. Culpability is not necessary for establishing
liability, which creates perverse incentives. Further, MDL settlements can
live in the shadows. Settlements do not need court approval, and
confidentiality agreements invariably prevent publication or assessment of
the details.233 Corporate abuses do not come to light in a process where there
are no trials, and no attempts are made to investigate malfeasance. The MDL
process was designed to efficiently resolve procedural matters and provide
compensation for meritorious claims.234 But the process does not effectively
further that goal. Resources that could go to actual victims are fragmented
by fraudulent claims.235
Mass tort personal injury cases make up 90 percent of MDL civil
actions.236 Consequently, the MDL distortion is having a profound effect on
these types of cases.237 Because of extreme lottery effects, erosion of

228. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
71, 73 (2015); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 541.
229. See Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict
Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109,
110 (2015) (“[T]he current practice of MDL actually makes the modern class action appear to
be the pinnacle of procedural due process by comparison.”).
230. Bradt, supra note 191, at 836 (“[T]here is no right to opt out of an MDL proceeding—
once you’re in, you’re in, often for years until ‘pretrial proceedings’ have concluded.”).
231. MDL judges have various means to compel settlement. Primarily, judges will
aggressively encourage parties to engage in settlement, including by appointing a special
master who will be actively involved in ensuring meaningful discussions. See, e.g., Pretrial
Order No. 6, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 15-MD-2672 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016), ECF No. 973. Judges can also hold on to cases
indefinitely and pressure settlement. Judges can focus initial discovery on information that is
necessary to assess settlement positions and front-load important dispositive motions. See,
e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 390 (E.D. Pa.
2015).
232. See sources cited supra note 160 (delineating extortion risks that some commentators
believe plague class actions); see also Chamblee, supra note 46, at 196.
233. See Erichson, supra note 223, at 1770.
234. See supra Part III.B.2.
235. See id.
236. See Metzloff, supra note 194, at 41.
237. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 174, at 1301.
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individual victims’ rights, and a lack of predictability, some scholars have
concluded that the MDL structure must be redesigned.238
c. Market Response
Compelled settlement with no prospect of adjudication may appear
attractive in some cases, but the overall risks are daunting. Distorted use
rarely creates an optimal structure, and it is no different with the MDL
process. However, my objective is not to debate the MDL process’s efficacy.
The process has produced many successful outcomes, but no one can dispute
that there exist numerous deficiencies.239 This Essay asserts that corporate
defendants involved in modern mass tort litigation have identified these
deficiencies and turned to the lone exit available. Only federal bankruptcy
has the power to free claims from MDL capture.240 In the last few years,
many defendants subject to—or facing the prospect of being subject to—an
MDL, including 3M, Johnson & Johnson, Purdue Pharma, Boy Scouts of
America, and USA Gymnastics, have turned to bankruptcy.241 These mass
restructurings transferred the adjudication of all claims against the entity at
issue to the bankruptcy court and halted any pending MDL process.242 I refer
to this election as “bankruptcy preemption.”
Ultimately, corporate defendants are drawn to bankruptcy as a means to
regain control over the resolution process. But bankruptcy preemption has
just replaced one deficient structure with another.
3. The Promise of Bankruptcy Preemption
Corporate defendants have started invoking bankruptcy preemption,
fleeing one deficient resolution structure for another. Market response
supports the argument that—in many modern mass tort cases—Chapter 11
bankruptcy offers substantive advantages over multidistrict litigation.
a. Chapter 11 Exceptionalism
Bankruptcy scholars do not always agree on federal bankruptcy’s purpose.
This stems in part from how versatile the process has become. Much like the
mass tort universe, corporate bankruptcies include an array of cases with
idiosyncratic dimensions that do not fit neatly into defined categories,
regardless of the level of abstraction to which a scholar may be willing to
proceed. Nevertheless, most scholars and practitioners would agree that

238. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 23, at 969 (describing MDL as a “costly, tragic, social
policy failure”).
239. See, e.g., Burch & Williams, supra note 226.
240. See Parikh, supra note 197.
241. David Skeel, The Populist Backlash in Chapter 11, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-populist-backlash-in-chapter-11/
[https://perma.cc/B976-GT6X].
242. See Parikh, supra note 197.
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corporate restructuring seeks to efficiently address contracting failure243 and
the collective action problem244 while maximizing value and minimizing
holdout245 and holdup246 risks. The restructuring takes place within a
flexible statutory process that effectively aggregates claims, binds creditors,
and offers myriad forms of relief available only in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy’s structural, procedural, and substantive benefits provide
optionality that serves as a sharp contrast to MDL’s settlement fixation.247
For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court
precedent limit federal district courts’ claim aggregation powers.248
Bankruptcy courts transcend these boundaries.249 Bankruptcy courts enjoy
jurisdiction over all “civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.”250 The seemingly boundless reach of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction allows the court to marshal all matters affecting
a debtor in one single venue for prompt and efficient adjudication for the
benefit of all stakeholders.
Coupled with this powerful in rem jurisdiction is the bankruptcy court’s in
personam jurisdiction over parties involved in litigation related to the
bankruptcy case.251 In contrast to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
243. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose
of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1715 (2020) (“[Contracting] failure
arises because financial distress presents uncertainty that is not contractible . . . . [There are]
too many parties . . . and too many contingencies . . . to define a set of [ex ante contract] rules
for every scenario.”); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92–93 (1989).
244. The collective action problem in this context describes creditors of a distressed
company and the broad array of ex post bargaining and coordination problems they face,
which—without some legislative intervention—would cause individual, self-interested
behavior to diminish the value realized by the creditor collective. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird
& Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate
Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 315 (1991). Scholars have recently argued that
enhanced coordination among sophisticated creditors has suppressed the risks posed by
collective action in many corporate bankruptcy cases. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & George
Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1817
(2018); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 653
(2010).
245. Holdout risk arises in situations where a certain threshold of consent from a group is
necessary before specified action can be undertaken; the risk is that one or a few members of
the group will withhold consent and seek a premium payment, even though the refusal to
comply harms the group’s collective interest. Because of class voting and other means of
statutory and judicial compulsion, the bankruptcy process is able to minimize holdout risk in
a way that is unavailable outside of bankruptcy.
246. Holdup risk arises in situations where creditors of a distressed company may be able
to work most efficiently by coordinating, but they eschew cooperation because of concerns
that they may give another creditor in their group oversized bargaining power and other
advantages. See generally Casey, supra note 243.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 211–31.
248. See Jones, supra note 164, at 1704.
249. Sections 157 and 1334 of title 28 of the U.S. Code collectively grant jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases to federal district courts, while standing orders of reference in each district
automatically refer these cases to bankruptcy courts.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
251. See McKenzie, supra note 155, at 1003.
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Procedure, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 permits nationwide
service of process.252 These procedural dimensions work together to afford
the bankruptcy court a unique jurisdictional arsenal that is useful in mass tort
litigation, where cases populate federal and state courts across the country.
Further, the bankruptcy court is authorized to identify claims subject to
pending litigation against the debtor and estimate the value of the claims that
cannot be resolved in a timely manner.253 After estimation, claimants are
allowed to participate in the proceedings but are subject to having their
claims ultimately discharged through a plan of reorganization.254 Rather than
fully adjudicating a dispute in the customary nonbankruptcy forum over the
course of multiple years, a bankruptcy judge assesses and values these claims
in order to allow the formulation of a settlement offer.
The ultimate goal of most reorganization proceedings is to formulate a
binding settlement delineated in the debtor’s plan of reorganization. In order
for a plan to be approved for implementation, creditors must vote and
ultimately approve its terms.255 Creditors are placed in classes based on the
substance of their interests and claims.256 Claimants who do not receive the
full satisfaction of their claim are deemed “impaired” and are allowed to
vote.257 Each impaired class must vote in favor of the plan in order for it to
be approved.258 However, unanimity is unnecessary. The Bankruptcy Code
minimizes holdout risk by deeming a class to have voted to approve a plan
when a majority of claimants vote to approve.259 Further, in order to avoid
potential tyranny by the majority, claimants holding two-thirds of the value
of claims within each class must also vote to approve the plan.260
Even with this holdout measure, securing consent from each creditor class
can be difficult. Therefore, the code contains the colorfully described
“cramdown” option, which allows a court to confirm a plan even if not all
creditor classes have consented, as long as the class has been treated fairly
and equitably and the plan does not discriminate unfairly.261
In many respects, decreased individual autonomy and protection is the tax
for settlement facilitated by bankruptcy aggregation. Once the plan is
approved, it serves to bind all pre-petition claimants, even for those who
voted against the plan or failed to participate in proceedings.262 Plan
confirmation includes powerful injunctions preventing various creditor
252. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004; Double Eagle Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. MarkWest Utica
EMG, L.L.C., 936 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2019) (“With nationwide service, the forum is the
United States. So minimum contacts with the United States (Fifth Amendment due process)
suffice . . . .”).
253. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
254. See id. § 1141 (explaining the effect of plan confirmation).
255. Id. § 1129.
256. Id. § 1122.
257. Id. § 1124.
258. Id. § 1129.
259. Id. § 1126.
260. Id.
261. See id. § 1129(b)(1).
262. See id. § 1126(c) (explaining plan voting).
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actions against the parties involved in the bankruptcy, as well as the
reorganized debtor.263
b. Brief History of § 524(g)
In addition to the comprehensive resolution platform described above,
federal bankruptcy offers a bespoke statutory provision for addressing mass
torts with asbestos exposure claims. Section 524(g) was built on the
foundation of In re Johns-Manville Corp.,264 the original asbestos
bankruptcy case. Even after almost a quarter of a century without
amendment, the section represents innovative problem-solving.
i. Johns-Manville
Johns-Manville Corporation was the largest producer of
asbestos-containing products and, by the 1980s, faced a litany of suits.265
The company filed for bankruptcy in 1982, but the code did not have a
specific statutory provision that provided guidance on how to address the
billions of dollars in claims against the company.266 Consequently, the case
languished for six years until stakeholders proposed transferring the payment
of the asbestos liabilities to a settlement trust.267 Pursuant to the debtors’
plan of reorganization, all asbestos claims—including those held by future
victims—were channeled to a $2.5 billion trust funded by the debtors and
related parties.268 In return, asbestos claims could not be brought against the
reorganized debtor or various other corporate entities involved in the
bankruptcy case.269
The bankruptcy court formulated two ways of addressing due process
concerns for future victims. Primarily, the court appointed a legal
representative to negotiate on behalf of future claimants.270 Further, a voting
proxy was used.271 The court asserted that future victims’ interests were
materially aligned with the interests of current victims.272 Based on this false
premise, the court reasoned that all victims’ interests would be protected if
an overwhelming number of current victims approved the plan.273 The court
required that at least 75 percent—as opposed to a mere majority as mandated
by the code—of the members of the current victims’ class had to approve the

263. See id. § 1141.
264. 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
265. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 85, at 5.
266. Id. at 5–7.
267. Id. at 5.
268. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 621–27.
269. Id. at 638.
270. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
271. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 631–33.
272. See id. Scholars and jurists have rejected this notion. See McKenzie, supra note 140,
at 74–76.
273. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 631–33.

2022]

THE NEW MASS TORTS BARGAIN

483

plan in order for the class to be deemed to have accepted the plan, and the
terms could bind current and future victims.274
The Manville Trust was expected to pay claimants close to 100 percent of
the settlement value of their claims.275 The court anticipated the trust
resolving approximately 83,000 to 100,000 claims, with a per claim value
around $25,000.276 The projections were wrong. By 1992, “more than
190,000 claimants were seeking compensation from the trust,”277 and the
trust was deemed insolvent just a few years after its inception.278 The parties
were forced to return to court to resolve the financial deficiency. 279 The
reorganized debtor contributed additional funds, and a new settlement was
implemented whereby the trust would follow an alternative compensation
plan that prioritized those with the most serious illnesses.280 This new
directive evolved into the compensation matrix that is ubiquitous today.
ii. Section 524(g) Overlay
After watching the Johns-Manville case languish in bankruptcy for six
years, the bankruptcy court forged the path forward with the simple idea that
a successful end would justify the means. Congress could have taken the
court’s creative—but significantly flawed—resolution design and improved
it. Rather, Congress undertook a wholesale codification. In 1994, Congress
added § 524(g) to the Bankruptcy Code.281 Generally, the subsection allows
debtors facing asbestos liabilities—and only those debtors—to fund a
settlement trust to resolve all claims in exchange for a channeling injunction
that provides immunity to the debtor, the reorganized debtor, and other
entities, including parent corporations, acquirers of assets, and insurance
companies.282 The injunction’s scope is extremely broad, capturing “any
right to or demand for payment that arises from the debtor’s underlying

274. See Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons
for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 583 (1995) (describing the plan as a “radical new
use of bankruptcy law”).
275. See id. at 602.
276. Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1932 (2002).
277. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 85, at 6 (citing History, MANVILLE PERS. INJ.
SETTLEMENT TR., https://mantrust.claimsres.com/history/ [https://perma.cc/C559-BMCV]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2022)).
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See MANVILLE PERS. INJ. SETTLEMENT TR., 2002 TRUST DISTRIBUTION
PROCESS (2021), https://www.claimsres.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2002-TDP-May2021-Revision-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCD8-3WJ3]. Unfortunately, the new directive
allowed the trust administrator to pay claimants a pro rata share of the liquidated value of their
claim based on a percentage set by the trust. The percentage was initially set at 10 percent in
1995 but was reduced to only 5.1 percent by 2022. See id.
281. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
282. Id. The benefits of § 524(g)’s channeling injunction are available only to debtors
facing claims based on asbestos exposure. The section layers additional requirements on top
of those already in place for debtors seeking confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization. Id.
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asbestos liabilities, regardless of when that right or demand arises, whether
it was raised during the bankruptcy proceeding or is contingent on a future
event.”283
Section 524(g) requires the bankruptcy court to find that the debtor faces
substantial contingent, unfiled claims that threaten to preclude repayment.284
In response, the court may approve a plan of reorganization with a settlement
trust and channeling injunction.285 The primary features of the plan are that
(1) the trust is funded by securities or debt from the debtor for the benefit of
present and future asbestos claims;286 (2) the channeling injunction prevents
attempts to pursue any claims based on asbestos exposure against parties
protected by the plan;287 (3) the trust owns a majority of the voting stock of
the reorganized debtor, the parent company of the debtor, or a subsidiary of
the debtor;288 (4) the trust pays present and future claims against the debtor
and other protected parties;289 (5) the plan is approved by a 75 percent vote
of current victims in number and by two-thirds of the voting claims in terms
of claim value;290 and (6) a future claim representative is appointed to
negotiate on behalf of future claimants but does not vote on the plan.291 The
court must have “reasonable assurance” that the trust will operate in a manner
such that similar claims will be treated in substantially the same manner.292
Modern mass torts rarely involve asbestos claims; § 524(g) does not apply
to these cases.293 Instead, mass tort debtors are fashioning their own ex post,
ad hoc resolution structure by cherry-picking attractive provisions and
concepts from § 524(g), incorporating them into a plan of reorganization, and
convincing bankruptcy courts to enforce these provisions pursuant to their
equitable powers under § 105.294 These plans seize § 524(g)’s benefits
without being subject to its procedural and substantive restrictions.
283. In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 2013).
284. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
285. Id. § 524(g)(2).
286. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).
287. See 140 CONG. REC. S14461, S14464 (1994) (statement of Sen. Howell T. Heflin)
(“[The statutory injunction] assur[es] investors, lenders, and employees that the reorganized
debtor has indeed emerged from Chapter 11 free and clear of all asbestos-related liabilities
other than those defined in the confirmed plan . . . . This added certainty will ensure that the
full value of such a trust’s assets—the securities upon which it relies in order to generate
resources to pay asbestos claims—can be realized.”).
288. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III); see, e.g., In re Plant Insulation Co., 734 F.3d 900,
906 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013).
289. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
290. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). The voting thresholds count only current victims who
are generally advised by plaintiffs’ attorneys. Neither future claimants—beneficiaries of the
trust—nor their appointed representative are included in the voting class. See id.
291. Id. § 524(g)(4)(B).
292. See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 239 (3d Cir. 2004).
293. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B) (noting that the subsection applies only to cases
involving claims based on an exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products).
294. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the bankruptcy court to “issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provision of this title.”
Id. § 105(a). This provision has been construed to afford bankruptcy courts sweeping powers,
and bankruptcy courts have not been shy about exploring the broadest reaches of the section’s
power conferment. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 340 (3d Cir. 2006).
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As detailed in the following part, a new bargain is being imposed on mass
tort victims.
IV. THE NEW BARGAIN
Part III explored the limited resolution options available in mass tort cases.
Legislative failure hoisted the problem onto the judiciary. In the 1990s, the
Supreme Court ruled that Rule 23’s strictures exclude many mass tort
cases.295 In response, policy makers embraced MDL to serve a role for which
it was not necessarily intended.296 Recognizing this incongruence, modern
mass tort defendants have begun invoking bankruptcy preemption and
exiting the MDL process.
This part explains how the bankruptcy process offers extensive options and
a bespoke resolution provision for debtors facing asbestos exposure claims.
But modern mass tort litigation rarely involves asbestos claims;297 § 524(g)
is unavailable in these cases.298 Mass tort debtors are exploiting statutory
gaps in the code to bind victims through an unpredictable, ad hoc structure.299
The impairment risks faced by future victims are significant. Three problems
complicate the process.
A. Exempt Plans: The Debtor-Designed, Ad Hoc Structure
Professor Rosenberg’s resolution paradigm for mass torts advocates for an
ex ante victim’s perspective, “which places individuals ‘behind a veil of
ignorance,’ without information about their particular situation in the ‘ex
post’ world-to-come of accident risk and scarce resources.”300 In
formulating key provisions of mass tort resolution structures, the paradigm
advises policy makers to consider the results that individuals would seek if
they knew they were to be mass tort victims seeking compensation from a
limited asset pool but did not know the extent or temporal dispersion of their
injuries.301
The crux of Professor Rosenberg’s construct is well known to bankruptcy
scholars. Creditors’ Bargain Theory has shaped bankruptcy policy for the
last forty years.302 The model “view[s] bankruptcy as a system designed to
mirror the agreement one would expect . . . creditors to form among
themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante
position.”303 The theory offers a way to conceptualize solutions to pernicious
295. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
296. See supra Part III.B.2.
297. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part III.B.3.b.ii.
299. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
300. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840 (2002).
301. See id.
302. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982). See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
303. Jackson, supra note 302, at 860.
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problems.304 A corollary to this theory is that a nondelineated, ad hoc
resolution process will produce distorted results as litigants are driven by ex
post, wealth-maximization strategies.305 In the mass tort context, this
behavior is exemplified by the fear that current victims and plaintiffs’
attorneys will coordinate with the corporate debtor and allow for disparate
treatment of future victims.
Section 524(g) attempts to limit these ex post, wealth-maximization
techniques, but the subsection applies only to mass tort debtors facing
asbestos exposure claims.306 One may conclude that mass tort debtors
excluded from § 524(g) are at a disadvantage. Quite the opposite is true.
Excluded debtors are fashioning their own ex post resolution structure by
cherry-picking attractive provisions and concepts from § 524(g),
incorporating them into a plan of reorganization, and then convincing
bankruptcy courts to enforce these provisions pursuant to their § 105
equitable powers.307 The technique creates what I refer to as an “exempt
plan.” An exempt plan seizes § 524(g)’s benefits—most notably the
channeling injunction—without being subject to its restrictions.
For example, § 524(g) has an onerous 75 percent voting threshold that
must be cleared before victims’ classes can be deemed to have “accepted”
the proposed plan.308 This threshold compromises the debtor’s bargaining
position by placing an inordinate amount of power in the hands of plaintiffs’
attorneys, who are essential for convincing their clients to vote in favor of
the plan.309 But exempt plans do not have to meet this voting threshold; a
simple majority vote is sufficient pursuant to the structures seen in modern
mass tort cases.310 Further, § 524(g) prevents plans of reorganization from
being approved without the consent of victim classes, precluding the debtor

304. The theory has recently received some criticism. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 243.
Professor Douglas G. Baird himself has cautioned against overreliance on the model. See
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 244, at 652–53. But I believe the theory does more than just
advocate for efficiency. In the mass torts context, the theory provides a useful perspective
from which to formulate policy design, independent of mere efficiency concerns.
305. See Rosenberg, supra note 300, at 833.
306. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.b.ii.
307. See, e.g., Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of Insys
Therapeutics, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-bk-11292
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14, 2020), ECF No. 1095; see also Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for
Boy Scouts of America and Delaware BSA, LLC, In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 18, 2020), ECF No. 20. In fact, corporate debtors who were entitled to
use § 524(g) have tried to ignore the subsection and convince bankruptcy courts to use § 105
to allow for an alternative structure. See generally In re Energy Future Holdings, Co., 949
F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2020).
308. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
309. See NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 175–76 (“The real bargaining leverage . . . lies with
plaintiffs’ lawyers who control large inventories of present claims . . . [and] have the power
effectively to veto any . . . plan.”).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 306–07.
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from “cramming down” these classes.311 But exempt plans do not face this
restriction.312
Section 524(g) places peculiar requirements on the funding for victims’
trusts, including that (1) the reorganized debtor is obligated to make future
payments to the trust and (2) the trust must be funded—at least in part—by
securities of the reorganized debtor or an affiliated entity.313 Further, the
section requires that the victims’ trust must own a majority of the voting
shares of the reorganized debtor314—a troubling requirement that could chill
equity investment in the business. Exempt plans do not have to abide by
these funding restrictions.315
As noted, § 524(g)’s channeling injunction and third-party releases are
arguably the most valuable aspects of the bankruptcy process.316 However,
with limited exceptions, these benefits were designed to protect the debtor.317
Nondebtor parties—including corporate parent and affiliate entities, as well
as insurance companies and other financiers—would love to free ride and
receive immunity. But these parties may only be protected if various onerous
criteria under § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) are satisfied.318 Nondebtor parties have
been unable to satisfy these criteria and have sought the injunction’s
protections under alternative bankruptcy provisions.319 These attempts have
been unsuccessful.320 Modern mass tort cases are not subject to this
restriction.321 Exempt plans authorize channeling injunctions and third-party
releases that protect a wide swath of nondebtor parties, including parent and
affiliate corporate entities, insurers, professional advisors, board members,

311. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
312. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 93 (delineating the debtors’ right to
cram-down victim classes, if necessary).
313. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).
314. See id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III).
315. See id. § 524(g)(2)(B) (noting that the subsection applies only to cases involving
claims based on an exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 281–83.
317. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (“Except as provided in subsection (a)(3), discharge of a debt
of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other
entity for, such debt.”).
318. See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding injunction
could not be extended to protect debtor’s parent entity); In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 453
B.R. 570, 590 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011) (finding injunction could not be extended to protect
nondebtor-affiliated entity).
319. For example, in In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., the debtor sought to extend the
injunction’s protection to two affiliated entities but could not satisfy § 524(g)(4)(A)’s criteria.
391 F.3d 190, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2004). The debtor was able to convince the bankruptcy court
to extend the injunction’s protections pursuant to the court’s § 105 equitable powers. Id. at
235. The Third Circuit rejected this action “[b]ecause . . . the general powers of § 105(a)
cannot be used to achieve a result not contemplated by the more specific provisions of
§ 524(g).” Id. at 236–37.
320. See id.
321. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B) (noting that the subsection applies only to cases
involving claims based on an exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products).
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and various administrative agents.322 The most prominent examples of this
are the releases the Sackler family received in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy
case.323 The necessary showing is merely that the protected party was
necessary in formulating and implementing the victims’ trust at issue.324
B. Due Process and the Future Claimants’ Representative
Due process can protect future victims from exempt plans that diverge too
aggressively from customary norms. Contemporary case law establishes that
interest representation can satisfy due process, but it offers little guidance on
what constitutes permissible design.325 Section 524(g) attempts to satisfy
322. See, e.g., Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of Insys
Therapeutics, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 307, at 73; see also Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization for Boy Scouts of America and Delaware BSA, LLC, supra note 307, at
50–53.
323. See Parikh, supra note 67, at 63 (providing details of the Sackler family’s releases).
The order confirming the plan of reorganization in the Purdue case was recently vacated
because of these releases, see Rick Archer, Purdue Pharma’s Ch. 11 Plan Is Unraveled on
Appeal, LAW360 (Dec. 16, 2021, 7:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1449669/
purdue-pharma-s-ch-11-plan-is-unraveled-on-appeal [https://perma.cc/C762-VY2N], though
Purdue has appealed, see Vince Sullivan, Purdue Ch. 11 Appeal Can Go to 2nd Circ., NY
Judge Rules, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2022, 3:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1453543/
purdue-ch-11-appeal-can-go-to-2nd-circ-ny-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/XS2N-7ELD].
324. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 27.
325. The Supreme Court’s constitutional property doctrine establishes that a cause of action
is a “property interest” of which a claimant cannot be deprived without due process of law.
See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428–29 (1982). A party alleging
contravention of the Due Process Clause must demonstrate a deprivation of a protected
interest—life, liberty, or property—and show that the process afforded was constitutionally
inadequate. See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 949 F.3d 806, 822 (3d Cir. 2020). From
that perspective, settlements can be conceptualized as a plaintiff selling their property—the
cause of action—to the defendant and relinquishing their rights of ownership. Property
owners should be involved in this sales process and enjoy the right to not sell. In rare cases
where forced sales are necessary, they should “be preceded by notice and [an] opportunity for
hearing.” See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). However,
rigid fidelity to procedural due process can be unreasonable in many instances, including in
mass tort cases. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). Future claimants—who must
be included in the claim aggregation process—cannot be provided actual notice or their “day
in court.” See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 126–27; Ryan C. Williams, Due Process,
Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 620–21 (2015).
But that does not necessarily preclude aggregation. Due process requires “only reasonable
notice, and that reasonableness [is] to be evaluated by balancing the state’s interest in [an]
existing notice scheme against the individual’s interest in receiving additional notice.” Robert
G. Bone, Rethinking the Day in Court Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193,
216 (1992). Contemporary case law establishes that interest representation can supplant actual
notice and case participation for absent parties. See Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793,
798–99 (1996); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002)
(reaffirming applicability of Mullane’s reasonableness test). But the unanswered question is,
under what parameters is this deviation acceptable? The concept of adequate representation
still lacks a concrete definition. See, e.g., Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV.
785, 791–92 (2017). Traditional interest representation is insufficient to address the
anticommons problem in modern mass tort cases because the interests of current and future
claimants are significantly misaligned. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852–53
(1999). Current victims want to access settlement funds immediately, even if that ensures that
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due process concerns in mass tort cases by requiring the appointment of a
future claimants’ representative (FCR) to advocate for future victims affected
by a channeling injunction. The idea has considerable value in theory. The
execution has been alarming.326
Section 524(g) requires the appointment of an FCR as part of its binding
aggregation process.327 In a customary agency relationship, the parties to be
represented select their agent. In mass tort agency, future victims are the
principal and, of course, they are absent from the process. This dynamic
allows for exploitation.328 Primarily, the code fails to prescribe selection
procedures for the FCR. This silence is surprising. The FCR is the sole
representative for future claimants who customarily hold claims valued at
hundreds of millions of dollars. These clients are unable to provide input for
the selection process. Nevertheless, the FCR negotiates with the debtor and
other stakeholders and is able to unilaterally bind all unknown class
members.329 The FCR has “extraordinary, exclusive power” but operates
without any client oversight.330 This lack of oversight is arguably
unavoidable in mass torts, but the agency breakdown is even more
pronounced than it seems. There is also no ex post check. Future victims
who later emerge and come to learn that the FCR agreed to extremely
disadvantageous terms cannot opt out of the agreement, and they have no
recourse against the FCR, who enjoys broad immunity for all actions aside
from fraud, gross negligence, and willful misconduct.331
future claimants face a famine. See id. Other stakeholders—including plaintiffs’ attorneys and
trial courts—are often willing to risk future claimants’ recovery in order to secure final
disposition of mass tort cases. See id. In many respects, due process represents one of the few
safeguards for future claimants.
326. My intent is not to assess whether the means of addressing claims held by future
claimants can withstand constitutional scrutiny. The asbestos exposure canon holds that due
process strictures are satisfied when an FCR is appointed to represent the interest of future
claimants. My objective is to analyze how to improve the FCR appointment process and the
execution of that office to fairly ensure that future claimants receive a recovery comparable to
current victims. However, I acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not reviewed these
bankruptcy provisions, and an argument could be made that the fundamentals of the current
process are, in fact, constitutionally deficient. See Sergio Campos & Samir D. Parikh, Due
Process Alignment in Mass Restructurings, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. 325 (2022) (exploring the
constitutionality of mass tort outcomes in bankruptcy). This may sound naive, considering
that this mechanism has been a part of numerous cases that have survived circuit court review.
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken up entrenched bankruptcy practices only to
rule that the structures were unconstitutional and needed to be dismantled. See, e.g., Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469, 503 (2011) (holding bankruptcy courts lack authority under
Article III to enter final judgment on a variety of claims); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding the Bankruptcy Code’s jurisdictional grant to
non–Article III judges to be unconstitutional); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement
Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530–32 (1936) (holding nation’s first municipal bankruptcy law to be
unconstitutional).
327. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
328. Jones, supra note 164, at 1713.
329. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
330. Jones, supra note 164, at 1713.
331. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 124–25; see also S. Todd Brown,
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The code assigns the task of selecting the FCR to the bankruptcy court,
without offering any further guidance.332 Bankruptcy courts have delegated
this responsibility to the corporate debtor, the very party against whom the
FCR will be negotiating.333 Invariably, the debtor is the only stakeholder
who proposes FCR candidates and, in almost all cases, nominates only
one.334 Courts are not required to give any deference to this nomination, but
they invariably approve the debtor’s nominee without considering anyone
else or even soliciting nominees from other stakeholders.335 Further, the only
standard of review adopted by courts is that the nominee be “disinterested,”
which represents an extremely low bar focused on whether the individual has
any overt conflicts of interest.336 Once a selection is made, courts do not
review the adequacy of the FCR’s representation.337
The idea that the FCR would fail to be a zealous advocate may seem
confusing at first but emerges with shocking clarity when one considers the
capture risk involved in mass tort cases. A small pool of professionals
manages the universe of mass tort bankruptcy cases, and the process is
characterized by repeat players.338 FCRs receive significant fees and, once
appointed, immediately hire as legal counsel the law firm at which they are
a partner, thereby amplifying the benefit.339 Therefore, the promise of
multiple engagements is a truly distortive incentive for these individuals.
This promise can incentivize an FCR to discount their invisible clients’

Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox,
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841, 897–902.
332. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
333. See Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future Claims
Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange
Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 271, 301–14 (2006) (“In almost every asbestos bankruptcy case to date, the bankruptcy
court has granted the debtor a presumptive right to select the FCR . . . .”). This delegation is
akin to allowing the debtor to select class representatives and counsel for the official creditors’
committee.
334. See, e.g., In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp., No. 18-27963, 2019 WL 4745879, at *5–6
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019); In re Fairbanks Co., 601 B.R. 831, 835–38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019);
In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., No. 19-10289, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1452, at *1, *10–15 (Bankr.
D. Del. May 8, 2019).
335. See In re G-I Holdings, Inc., Nos. 01-30135 & 01-38790, 2006 WL 2403531, at *2
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2006).
336. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14); In re Duro Dyne, 2019 WL 4745879, at *1. But see In re
Fairbanks, 601 B.R. at 839–41 (ruling that the “disinterestedness” standard was insufficient
and reviewing the FCR nominee under the more demanding standards applicable to
appointments of guardians ad litem).
337. See Brown, supra note 331, at 899.
338. See, e.g., In re Fairbanks, 601 B.R. at 835, 841 (“[T]he danger is that the FCR is part
of a closed group and has an incentive to advocate . . . so that the FCR remains in the group at
the expense of future claimants. A[n FCR] who ‘rocks the boat’ . . . may not be in the next
boat.”); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 176–78.
339. For example, when selected as an FCR, James L. Patton, Jr., always hires Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, the firm at which he is an equity partner. See, e.g.,
Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Imerys Talc America,
Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 18, In re Imerys
Talc Am., Inc., No. 19-10289 (Bankr. D. Del. May 15, 2020), ECF No. 1715.
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interests.340 FCRs seeking subsequent engagements face extreme pressures
to avoid taking positions in one case that may alienate key parties who will
be involved in future cases.341 The reality is that today’s adversary could be
tomorrow’s client.342
The distortive pressures go further. Keep in mind that courts are not
immune to self-interested behavior. A confirmed reorganization plan is to a
bankruptcy judge what a global settlement is to an MDL judge: an
unadulterated success.343 An amenable FCR greatly improves the likelihood
of that result. An overly zealous FCR who risks creating an impasse could
push the case into liquidation—an outcome that is considered to be a failure
to jurists and bankruptcy professionals alike.
The FCR structure is extremely beneficial to the debtor and current victims
because it allows them to overcome the anticommons problem and then
leverage the other components of the bankruptcy process to secure
settlement. Unfortunately, the nature of these disputes breaks down basic
agency principles. Neither the code nor the judiciary offers a means to
reassemble the pieces. Ultimately, accommodating FCRs receive rewards
without consequences. A dereliction of duty is in the best interests of all
parties at the bargaining table.
C. Estimating the Value of Future Victims’ Claims
Bankruptcy courts must estimate the aggregate value of future claims344 in
order to overcome the anticommons problem. Section 502(c) authorizes
claim estimation for plan confirmation.345 The estimate is vital because the
340. In re Fairbanks, 601 B.R. at 835 (“The idea is that the [FCR] . . . will ‘go along to get
along’ to the detriment of future claimants in order to be selected for the next case.”).
341. See McKenzie, supra note 140, at 74–76.
342. In approving FCRs, courts regularly tout that a particular individual is qualified
because the nominee has been selected in various other cases, see In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp.,
No. 18-27963, 2019 WL 4745879, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019), but fail to consider that
appointing this familiar face should raise impartiality concerns. James L. Patton, Jr., has
served as an FCR in eight different cases in just the last ten years. See Debtors’ Motion for
Entry of an Order Appointing James L. Patton, Jr., as Legal Representative for Future
Claimants, Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date at 14–16, In re Boy Scouts of Am.,
No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2020), ECF No. 223; see also NAGAREDA, supra
note 46, at 176–78 (noting the small pool of FCRs).
343. See Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort Bankruptcy:
A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 69–71 (2000).
344. There has been some debate whether the term “claim” as defined in the code can
capture unfiled claims of future claimants. Bankruptcy courts would be precluded from
adjudicating future claims if these claims are excluded from the definition of “claim.”
However, courts have construed the term “claim” broadly, and I do not view this as a live
controversy. See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 125 (3d
Cir. 2010); see also Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 58.
345. Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy courts to estimate
contingent and unliquidated claims, but the statute appears to limit this estimation for purposes
of allowance and voting. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a). Estimation for purposes of
distribution—the reason estimation is sought in mass tort bankruptcies—is not explicitly
authorized. See id. Nevertheless, courts have consistently undertaken estimation for plan
confirmation—and presumably for distribution—in mass tort cases. See, e.g., In re Garlock
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present value of the total of all victims’ claims constitutes the debtor’s trust
liability. With that number, the key parties can begin the final design of the
plan of reorganization. The significance of the final number cannot be
overstated; it will be transformative for the case and all affected victims.
The code fails to provide instruction on estimation mechanics or
methodology.346 Courts are instructed to choose “the appropriate method of
estimation in light of the particular circumstances of the bankruptcy case
before [them].”347 Consequently, this essential process devolves to a battle
of experts.348 Indeed, experts representing the debtor, the official
committees, and other stakeholders present highly speculative assessments
that happen to perfectly align with their client’s interests.349 The bankruptcy
court is tasked with sorting this quagmire and selecting the estimation that it
finds most plausible.350 But the idea that the bankruptcy court will, after a
few days of hearings, estimate thousands of victims’ claims totaling hundreds
of millions of dollars is arguably absurd.351 Bankruptcy courts rarely
undertake this herculean task and, in fact, are precluded from adjudicating
personal injury cases.352 But the estimation process ignores this inexperience
and allows these jurists to determine the aggregate value of claims, having

Sealing Techs., LLC, 504 B.R. 71, 74 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014); In re Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 124 (D. Del. 2006).
346. S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT
BANKRUPTCY CASES 90 (2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/gibsjudi_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PQY-CBRY] (“[N]either section 502(c) nor any provision of the
Bankruptcy Rules provides any guidance about the method the judge should use.”).
347. In re G-I Holdings, Inc., Nos. 01-30135 & 01-38790, 2006 WL 2403531, at *2 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2006).
348. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 115, 125 (“Although there is no dearth of
well-compensated experts willing to assume the task of predicting the future asbestos personal
injury liability of companies emerging from bankruptcy . . . the number of possible variables
makes any pretense to certainty illusory.”).
349. Estimation hearings are multiday affairs filled with conflicting expert witness
testimony. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322 B.R. 719, 721
(D. Del. 2005) (expert assessment of total liability ranging from a low at $2.08 billion to a
high of $11.1 billion); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 699
(4th Cir. 1989) (ranging from $600 million to $7 billion); In re Garlock Sealing, 504 B.R. at
74 (ranging from $125 million to $1.3 billion). These hearings are also full of misleading
evidence. See, e.g., id. at 86–87 (determining that plaintiffs’ attorneys had withheld material
exposure evidence that had unfairly inflated the debtor’s liabilities, a practice that was
widespread and affected many asbestos cases).
350. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 134 (“Presented with three estimates of . . .
pending and future asbestos personal injury liability . . . the Court . . . finds that $3.1 billion is
a reasonable prediction . . . .”).
351. See Jones, supra note 164, at 1714–16.
352. See id. Bankruptcy judges lack authority to adjudicate personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Bankruptcy courts may not estimate personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims for purposes of making a distribution from estate assets.
See id. Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, does not prevent courts from
estimating these claims in order to allow the debtor to formulate a plan of reorganization, the
terms of which creditors can agree to be binding. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
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never conducted a single jury trial, taken any victim testimony, or thoroughly
assessed historical data.353
Some jurists have rejected the premise that bankruptcy judges can
“accurately estimate the results of a series of extremely speculative
problems” and have refused to undertake the task;354 all acknowledge the
process’s systemic flaws.355 Nevertheless, many courts have no choice but
to estimate claims. Plan confirmation is unavailable without this number.
D. Consequences of the New Bargain
Mass restructurings reveal bankruptcy’s structural and substantive
deficiencies, which culminate in various practical consequences, including a
lack of predictability, loss of victim autonomy, and suppressed recoveries.
However, the most concerning of these potential consequences is disparate
treatment between current and future victims. If current victims and
plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to coordinate with corporate debtors and
other stakeholders, it could result in an underfunded victims’ trust that allows
for immediate compensation but faces premature insolvency.356 The
consequence of this coordination will not be apparent for years after the plan
of reorganization is confirmed; indeed, there is a long latency period with
this financial harm, just as there is a long latency period for many of the
injuries that underlie these tort cases. Insolvent trusts create the unacceptable
risk that mere temporal dispersion will allow one victim to receive a
significant recovery while another similarly situated victim seeking
compensation just a few years later receives nothing.
One would imagine that a process built around a compensation trust with
a potential risk of insolvency would require some contingency plan. But
exempt plans have absolutely no contingency plans for addressing
prematurely insolvent trusts.357 Future victims have no recourse against the
353. See In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 124 (acknowledging that estimation under § 502(c)
involves making “predictions which are themselves based upon predictions and assumptions”
(quoting In re Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322 B.R. 719, 721 (D. Del.
2005)); see also Campos & Parikh, supra note 326, at 357–59 (arguing for coordination
between district and bankruptcy courts to allow for bellwether trials in these cases to inform
the estimation process).
354. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 562 n.16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
(refusing to adopt an estimation process and urging the parties to reach a consensual
resolution).
355. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 115 (“The best the court can do is to consider
the expert reports . . . ‘while remaining vigilant to the potential bias that a party’s expert may
have . . . .’” (quoting In re Fed.-Mogul Glob., Inc., 330 B.R. 133, 156 (D. Del. 2005))).
356. See Parikh, supra note 67, at 64 (“[Victim balkanization] is the process by which
debtors pit current victims against future victims with a simple threat: any attempt to secure
comparable recoveries across the victim class will lead to significant delays in case resolution
and ultimately deprive current victims of any recovery in the short term.”).
357. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Imerys
Talc America, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code , supra
note 339, at 74 (failing to establish a contingency in the event of trust insolvency); Disclosure
Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors, supra note 27, at 110–89 (same).
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corporate tortfeasor, because that entity was dissolved through the
bankruptcy process. Future victims have no recourse against the reorganized
debtor or acquirer of assets because those entities assume no liability for the
corporate debtor’s pre-petition conduct. Future victims lack meaningful
opt-out rights.358 They also have no recourse against the FCR that accepted
an underfunded plan or any other party, because all are either protected by a
channeling injunction or enjoy immunity through the plan.359
Is all hope lost? Not necessarily. Current structural anomalies are
allowing debtors to fashion a distortive new bargain. But bankruptcy is still
the optimal venue for resolving many mass tort cases.360 As detailed below,
revising a few bankruptcy provisions can create the most efficient and
equitable option for modern mass tort cases.
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF BANKRUPTCY SUPERPOSITION
Part IV explained how mass tort defendants have begun invoking
bankruptcy preemption and exiting the MDL process. Unfortunately,
bankruptcy preemption has just replaced one deficient structure with another.
But unlike the MDL process, bankruptcy has the potential to layer multiple
forms of delineated relief and revenue-generating mechanisms that are
particularly impactful for the resolution of mass tort cases. Transformative
benefits are available if certain facets of the current platform can be
corrected.
A. Structural and Substantive Objectives
Administrative peacemaking presents challenges. Professor Nagareda has
explained that “the challenge lies in lending a structure to peacemaking that
affords latitude for creativity to generate value but, at the same time, inhibits
plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants from largely appropriating that value for
themselves.”361 While this account is accurate, Professor Nagareda told only
part of the story. In fact, the objective must go further. The structure must
preserve value and ensure that plaintiffs’ lawyers, defendants, and current
victims will not appropriate value to the detriment of future victims.
What are the goals of this process? The process must aggregate claims
and then bind claimants; there must be a meaningful level of predictability in
the delineation and execution of the process; defendants should enjoy relative
finality and meaningful options to preserve enterprise value; plaintiffs’
recoveries should approximate litigation outcomes, and settlements should
358. To date, plans in these cases have afforded claimants an opt-out right in name only.
See Disclosure Statement for Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of
Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 12–13, In re Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2021), ECF No. 2969. Claimants who opt out may
recover only the amount they otherwise would have received under the liquidation procedures
for the victims’ trust. See id.
359. See, e.g., Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Boy Scouts of America and Delaware
BSA, LLC, supra note 307, at 53.
360. See generally Parikh, supra note 197.
361. NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at xi.
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be scrutinized for their fairness and integrity (more specifically, in this
context, we want to avoid disparate treatment of similarly situated victims);
lastly, all parties deserve resolution on an accelerated timeline.
The confluence of these objectives highlights the deficiencies of current
options and historical proposals for structural modification. The mass tort
canon is filled with radical proposals to more effectively resolve mass torts,
including through unique compensation schemes,362 wholesale transfer of
bankruptcy court powers to nonbankruptcy courts,363 reliance on exotic
financial instruments,364 and the creation of statutory superpriority for tort
victims.365
Ultimately, historical proposals fail to address the novel challenges posed
by modern mass restructurings. In the next section, I eschew radical reforms
and return to the idea of a legislative solution implemented by the judiciary;
a normative construct that minimizes misallocation risk and places the
burden of alignment not on elaborate compensation schemes or financial
markets, but on the bankruptcy court—the entity best positioned to bear this
burden.

362. Professor Nagareda proposed modifying plaintiffs’ attorneys’ compensation to
incentivize aggressive advocacy of both current and future claimants, but he did not provide
any meaningful specifics about how such an elaborate deviation from accepted norms would
be structured or if this one change would be sufficient to address other resolution obstacles.
See id. at 232–38.
363. Professor Troy A. McKenzie advocated for the use of meaningful provisions from the
Bankruptcy Code in nonbankruptcy aggregation proceedings. See McKenzie, supra note 155,
at 1016–24. He acknowledged that this action is unlikely, see id., and I agree with that
assessment. I also question the use of bankruptcy as a model for resolving mass tort litigation,
when modifying the process itself is a far easier and more likely legislative outcome. Also,
the prevalence of bankruptcy preemption in modern mass torts impedes the viability of
Professor McKenzie’s proposal. See also Francis E. McGovern, Asbestos Legislation II:
Section 524(g) Without Bankruptcy, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 252–54 (2003) (proposing
legislation that would ostensibly make § 524(g) available to mass tort defendants outside of
bankruptcy and describing a settlement model that arguably mirrors the existing MDL
process).
364. Professor Thomas A. Smith proposes the creation of a liquidating trust in which
victims receive shares that they can sell in the capital markets when they need cash. See
Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367
(1994). While certainly inventive, this proposal assumes a robust market for this type of
security, which Professor Smith acknowledged was unlikely to exist. See id. at 429. Without
a robust market, information gaps regarding the value of such shares would lead to extreme
price discounting as investors bear assessment cost. This proposal places the burden of market
failures on future claimants.
365. In 1984, a student note suggested that mass torts could be resolved more equitably if
tort claimants were afforded a superpriority lien on debtor assets. See Christopher M.E.
Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secure Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst
of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1080–83 (1984). The idea was embraced by academics in
the late twentieth century. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 340 (1993); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1569 (1991). But no
congressional action followed. See Vincent S.J. Buccola & Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durability
and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 766, 783 (2021).
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B. Two Spheres of the Normative Construct
This section develops a conceptual framework for an efficient and
equitable mass tort resolution structure. The key substantive objectives of
this structure can be furthered by focusing on two core spheres:
(1) addressing disparate treatment of similarly situated victims by
minimizing the systemic failures in the FCR process and (2) codifying the
key aspects of the resolution overlay for mass tort cases.
Changes in these two spheres bring focus on the negotiation structure for
these restructuring cases and solvency of resulting trusts. By bolstering
judicial oversight and FCR advocacy and accountability, the process will
maximize available trust funds and improve equality of distribution across
victim classes. This improved negotiation structure allows for the
elimination of various § 524(g) restrictions that fail to further key objectives,
thereby streamlining the court’s inquiry.366
1. Reassembling Agency Principles in the Selection Process for the
Future Claimants’ Representative
The FCR is the linchpin in addressing the anticommons problem in modern
mass tort litigation, but this key figure lacks a statutory definition. The FCR
is tolerated by the other stakeholders who seek global settlement. As detailed
above, there is a material capture risk with FCRs that undermines the
integrity of the resolution process.367 FCRs lack incentives to advocate
zealously but, in many cases, they also lack the means. The FCR can be a
terrible agent for future victims. The statutory revisions below seek to bring
the FCR out of the shadows, more empowered.
a. Minimizing Capture Risk
The code does not prescribe a process for appointing the FCR or the
standard to be used for this selection.368 Courts have delegated this task to
the corporate debtor.369 Of course, the debtor is the very party against whom
the FCR will be negotiating. The most effective way to reduce obvious
capture risk is to mandate that the U.S. Trustee (UST)—the party that already
manages the committee appointment process under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code—oversee FCR selection. A new statutory subsection to § 524(g)
366. Policy makers and jurists have spent too much time conceptualizing resolution design
and interpreting § 524(g), guided by what the Johns-Manville court envisioned. This
evaluative perspective should be abandoned. See, e.g., In re Plant Insulation, 734 F.3d 900,
906 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he original Johns-Manville case is a distant memory[, and the present
case] could hardly be more different . . . .”). Johns-Manville was an idiosyncratic case, which
forced the court to take extremely aggressive and desperate actions that were uniquely tailored
to the problems at hand.
367. See supra Part IV.D.
368. See Motion of the United States Trustee to Appoint a Legal Representative for Future
Asbestos Claimants at 7–13, In re Fairbanks, No. 18-41768 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2018),
ECF No. 157.
369. See id.
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should provide that the UST will compile a list of independent candidates
and be tasked with selecting an FCR from this list subject to approval by the
bankruptcy court.370 Parties in interest may nominate candidates, but the
UST’s master list should include candidates that the UST identifies
independently. Further, the bankruptcy court should be authorized to remove
an FCR after appointment if the court determines that the change is necessary
to ensure adequate representation of future victims.371
Corporate debtors currently control the nomination process, and
bankruptcy courts invariably approve lone nominees under the
“disinterestedness” standard, which represents an extremely low bar focused
on whether the individual has any overt conflicts of interest.372 This standard
is used for evaluating agents in bankruptcy who are actively managed by their
principals but is inappropriate in light of the lack of customary agency
controls for future victims.
Conceptualizing the FCR as a guardian ad litem offers an improved
framework. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permit the court to
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent an incompetent person who cannot
appear in proceedings or otherwise represent themselves.373 The Bankruptcy
Code does not define guardian ad litem, but the “overarching purpose of the
role is to protect the rights of persons in litigation who cannot represent
themselves.”374 Future victims are not incompetent in a traditional sense, but
they are unable to appear in a proceeding or otherwise retain a representative.
Courts have been willing to appoint guardians under similar circumstances
in other contexts.375
This new framework would result in a modified assessment of FCR
candidates. Under the guardian model, the bankruptcy court must—in
addition to finding that a candidate is disinterested, qualified, and
competent—determine that a candidate will act as an objective, impartial,
and effective advocate for future victims. Courts should undertake a
370. This change aligns with the appointment powers afforded to the U.S. Trustee in other
contexts. See 11 U.S.C. § 332 (directing UST to appoint consumer privacy ombudsman); id.
§ 333 (directing UST to appoint patient care ombudsman). The UST filed a motion seeking a
similar process in In re Fairbanks. See Motion of the United States Trustee to Appoint a Legal
Representative for Future Asbestos Claimants, supra note 368. Additional candidates were
considered by the court. See Transcript of Hearing on the U.S. Trustee’s Motion to Appoint a
Legal Representative for Future Asbestos Claimants at 32–38, In re Fairbanks, No. 18-41768,
at 32–38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2019), ECF No. 183. However, the debtor’s nominee was
ultimately selected. See Order on Appointment of Future Claimants’ Representative at 3, In
re Fairbanks, No. 18-41768 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2019), ECF No. 260.
371. This language comports with the standard delineated in § 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code for removal of committee members. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
372. See, e.g., Motion of the United States Trustee to Appoint a Legal Representative for
Future Asbestos Claimants, supra note 368, at 9–10.
373. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 affords courts this authority, and Rules 7017 and
9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure make the rule applicable in bankruptcy
proceedings. FED. R. CIV. P. 17; FED. R. BANKR. P. 7017, 9014.
374. In re Fairbanks Co., 601 B.R. 831, 840 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019).
375. See, e.g., Burress v. Blake, No. 14-cv-35, 2016 WL 11475018, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
1, 2016) (appointing guardian to review settlement on behalf of plaintiff who had disappeared
prior to trial).
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qualitative assessment that considers (1) how often a candidate has served as
an FCR, (2) to which law firm or organization the candidate is affiliated, and
(3) which party in interest—if any—nominated that candidate. Experience
is important. But the utility of experience can, after a certain point, be
overwhelmed by capture risk.
b. Condorcet Jury Theorem and FCR Voting
Condorcet Jury Theorem was formulated to assess the optimal size of a
deliberative body and support the binding effect of majority and
supermajority voting.376 The theorem has been applied by scholars assessing
juries.377 But the theorem has broader applications and posits an interesting
proposition. Imagine that a person is choosing between two options: one is
deemed correct and the other incorrect. Further assume that the probability
that the person will choose the correct option is only slightly greater than
50 percent. The Condorcet Jury Theorem holds that having multiple
individuals vote—instead of just one—significantly increases the probability
that the correct option will be chosen.378
The theorem provides a useful perspective from which to view the FCR
construct. In mass restructurings, there are arguably “correct” choices that
increase the likelihood of viable settlement trusts. The bankruptcy process
can be redesigned to nudge FCRs toward these choices. The current
formulation places too much power in the hands of one FCR. I argue that a
true committee representing future victims is the optimal structure. Three
FCRs should be appointed to negotiate on behalf of future victims.379 This
376. See generally Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability—Ironies in the Evolution of
Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975 (1998).
377. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1477, 1498 (1999).
378. See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002).
379. I anticipate an argument that adding two additional FCRs would be cost prohibitive.
But this argument overlooks the fact that modern mass tort cases are adjudicating thousands
of claims through a multibillion-dollar settlement trust. In this context, total FCR fees are
immaterial. For example, in the Takata bankruptcy case, the FCR’s fees totaled approximately
$1.42 million. Final Fee Application of Roger Frankel, the Future Claimants’ Representative,
for Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses
Incurred for the Period of July 20, 2017 Through April 10, 2018, In re TK Holdings, Inc.,
No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 2865. The fees and expenses of the
FCR’s professionals totaled approximately $5.14 million. See Final Application for
Compensation of Ashby & Geddes, P.A., as Co-Counsel to the Future Claimants’
Representative, for Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement
of Expenses Incurred for the Period July 24, 2017 to April 10, 2018, In re TK Holdings, Inc.,
No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 2867; Final Application for
Compensation of Gnarus Advisors LLC as Claims Evaluation Consultants to the Future
Claimants’ Representative for the Period September 1, 2017 to April 10, 2018, In re TK
Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 2868; Final Fee
Application of Greenberg Traurig, LLP for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses
as Special Counsel to the Future Claimants’ Representative, In re TK Holdings, Inc.,
No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 2869; Summary of Final Fee
Application of Frankel Wyron LLP, as Counsel to the Future Claimants’ Representative, for
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small-scale committee reduces capture risk because distorted self-interest is
more easily managed as additional individuals are added to a process that
originally involved one decision-maker.380 Further, Condorcet Jury
Theorem supports the idea that a true committee approach will improve
decision-making.381
The members of this new committee deserve some of the rights afforded
to members of other committees. In particular, the new committee deserves
the right to vote on any proposed plan of reorganization. Unsecured creditor
voting in bankruptcy is premised on parties being organized into classes and
on majority votes binding class members.382 Current victims in mass tort
cases are organized in classes and vote on proposed plans of
reorganization.383 Future victims are organized in this fashion, but, under
the existing framework, their representative does not vote.
The code should be modified so that a plan can be confirmed only if both
current and future victims’ classes accept the plan.384 Two out of the three
FCRs must vote in favor of a proposed plan in order for the future victims’
class to be deemed to have accepted the plan. Finally, the statute should
provide that an FCR may only vote in favor of a proposed plan if the FCR
possesses a reasonable belief that the terms of the trust ensure that claims of
similarly situated victims will receive substantially similar treatment.
2. Codifying the Basic Structure
Revising the FCR process is a necessary improvement but is insufficient
standing alone. Codifying an improved resolution structure is necessary.
Indeed, modern mass tort cases are not subject to § 524(g)’s various
Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred
for the Period of July 24, 2017 Through April 10, 2018, In re TK Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375
(Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 2866. These costs represent less than 8 percent of
the overall fees charged by legal professionals in the case, see Fee Examiner’s Final Report
Regarding Third Interim and Final Fee Application Requests of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
at 9, In re TK Holdings Inc., No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. June 21, 2018), ECF No. 3011,
and a fraction of the $1.6 billion asset sale that was only possible because the corporate debtor
was allowed to channel the claims of future claimants to the settlement trust. See Naomi
Tajitsu, Key Safety Systems Completes Deal to Acquire Air-Bag Maker Takata, REUTERS (Apr.
11, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-takata-sale-key-safety-systems/keysafety-systems-completes-deal-to-acquire-air-bag-maker-takata-idUSKBN1HI3CG
[https://perma.cc/MN6U-C9TS]. Further, approximately 80 percent of the costs associated
with the Takata FCR were the professional fees of their legal and financial advisors. See Fee
Examiner’s Final Report Regarding Third Interim and Final Fee Application Requests of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP, supra, at 9. These fees likely will not fluctuate materially with the
addition of two FCRs. Ultimately, cost is not a deterrent to adding two additional FCRs.
380. See Edelman, supra note 378, at 328.
381. See id.
382. For an impaired class to have deemed to have accepted a proposed plan of
reorganization, a majority in number and claimants holding two-thirds of the aggregate value
of claims must vote to approve the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
383. See id. §§ 1122, 1126, 1129.
384. In other words, a revised § 524(g) will prevent plans from being crammed down on
dissenting victims’ classes, though cramdown will be available for other types of creditor
classes. See id. § 1129(b)(1).
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restrictions, but exempt plans in these cases seize all the benefits in
fashioning an unpredictable, ad hoc resolution. Simply modifying the code
so that all mass torts are subject to § 524(g) would be a half measure. As
noted above, the section was drafted to address the unique problems posed
by asbestos exposure cases. Merely subjecting all modern mass tort cases to
the section would improve predictability but would fail to address the
section’s glaring substantive deficiencies. A more sweeping revision is
warranted.
Primarily, § 524(g) must be made applicable to modern mass tort cases.
I propose amending § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) to capture corporate debtors that
have been named as defendants in personal injury, wrongful death, or
property damage actions (1) seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused
by the presence of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products;
(2) aggregated and transferred by the JPML to a single federal district court
for pretrial proceedings; or (3) that the bankruptcy court determines contain
substantial future demands for payment that cannot be addressed equitably
without the subsection’s protections. Affected corporate debtors wishing to
include a channeling injunction in a plan of reorganization will be required
to comply with the section. For most mass torts, bankruptcy courts would no
longer be able to approve exempt plans pursuant to § 105, closing a
significant statutory loophole.
Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) provides that victims’ claims that are to be
satisfied by the settlement trust must be organized into a separate class, and
75 percent of the members of that class must vote to approve the plan of
reorganization for it to be confirmed.385 This requirement comes from the
Johns-Manville court, which mistakenly believed that overwhelming support
by current victims would indicate a good deal for future victims and address
due process concerns.386 But this premise is entirely misguided. As detailed
in Part III.B, the interests of current and future victims are misaligned. The
75 percent threshold gives courts a false impression that they have addressed
disparate treatment. The requirement also puts too much power in the hands
of a few plaintiffs’ attorneys who represent the bulk of current victims.387
The debtor must appease this small group of attorneys in order to clear the
daunting threshold, which places these individuals in a position to distort the
distribution scheme to favor current victims.388 With the changes noted in
this part, a new committee populated with three FCRs would be tasked with
voting on the plan and determining what is in the best interests of future
victims. Therefore, the basis for the 75 percent threshold disappears entirely,
and the requirement should be eliminated.389

385. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii).
386. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 630–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
387. See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 46, at 176–78.
388. See id.
389. Naturally, existing requirements would still apply, and a proposed plan could not be
confirmed unless a majority of claimants and claimants holding two-thirds of claim value in a
class vote to accept the proposed plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
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Plans of reorganization that utilize a § 524(g) settlement trust should have
a provision detailing how the risk of trust insolvency has been addressed. As
described above, there is a risk that latent financial harm is embedded in
many of these cases, and trusts could become insolvent prematurely.390
A new subsection should be added to § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) that requires the
bankruptcy court to have reasonable assurance that the settlement trust will
not become insolvent prior to resolving all expected claims, pursuant to the
compensation matrix delineated in the plan of reorganization. Currently, the
court is required to have only a reasonable assurance that the trust will pay
present and future claims in substantially the same manner.391 But a
prematurely insolvent trust may provide similarly meager distributions to
both current and future victims. The current requirement is useful but does
little to focus the court on the problem of the trust becoming insolvent
prematurely.
The final major piece of this Essay’s proposal involves entirely
eliminating the requirements delineated in §§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) and
524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III). These restrictions unnecessarily inhibit the debtor’s
funding options in a failed attempt to tie the trust’s fortunes to the reorganized
debtor’s post-petition success. These subsections fashion a poor proxy for
eliminating the risk of insolvent trusts. Subsection II currently requires that
the settlement trust be funded by the debtor’s securities and an obligation to
make future payments.392 But the provision has no impact in practice.
Debtors subject to asbestos exposure claims invariably fund settlement plans
with insurance proceeds and capital contributions from parent entities or
affiliates.393 In order to satisfy subsection II, parties place near-worthless
securities in the settlement trust—or actually require the trust to purchase
these securities—and then provide some nominal future payment
obligation.394 These components fail to help the trust avoid insolvency.
Subsection III currently requires that the trust own a majority of the voting
shares of the reorganized debtor or its affiliates.395 However, the crux of this
requirement is easily circumvented. The reorganized debtor that emerges
from the bankruptcy does not have to continue the business that initially
made the corporate debtor profitable or maintain any meaningful operations.
Indeed, many mass restructurings are characterized by asset sales that
provide the primary means of value maximization,396 and often, the debtor’s
valuable assets and operations are sold to another party.397 In order to satisfy
subsection III in these cases, asbestos plans have merely set up a dummy

390. See supra Part IV.D.
391. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
392. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).
393. See, e.g., In re Plant Insulation Co., 734 F.3d 900, 915 (9th Cir. 2013).
394. See id. at 907.
395. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III).
396. However, this approach has been criticized. See Parikh, supra note 107, at 430–31
(arguing that rushed asset sales can suppress realized proceeds).
397. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 27, at 9.
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reorganized debtor that holds various causes of action of questionable value
but has no meaningful operations that could generate value to support a
faltering trust.398 A majority ownership stake in these dummy entities has
marginal value. Consequently, subsection III’s requirement similarly fails to
support the solvency of the settlement trust.
Ultimately, provisions that seek to create significant contingent liabilities
that withstand the bankruptcy process undermine finality and are detrimental
to value preservation. Investors and creditors will price the contingencies
into the assessed value of any equity issued, asset sold, or debt borrowed by
the debtor, which invariably destroys value. The primary benefits of the
channeling injunction are eliminating the risk of discounting and maximizing
asset values through the bankruptcy process.399
As we saw in
Johns-Manville,400 § 524(g)’s current financing restrictions do not minimize
the risk of an insolvent trust, but they do suppress the value of the debtor and
the debtor’s assets. The objective of these financing provisions should be to
maximize the value of funds contributed to the settlement trust. Within these
new statutory parameters, the debtor should be afforded flexibility and
finality.401
CONCLUSION
A new strategy has emerged in the mass tort kingdom. Corporate
defendants trapped in multidistrict litigation are filing for bankruptcy and
exiting one claim aggregation process for another. Bankruptcy allows some
mass tort debtors to impose a new bargain on victims—one that could raise
the risk of insolvent settlement trusts and disparate treatment across victim
classes. This Essay proposes an unprecedented, normative construct that
addresses anticommons dynamics and remedies statutory failings in order to
improve predictability, efficiency, and victim recoveries.

398. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Imerys
Talc America, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra
note 339, at 59–60 (setting up a dummy reorganized debtor to merely hold various causes of
action of questionable value).
399. See 140 CONG. REC. 7989, 8021 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hank Brown) (“Without a
clear statement in the code of a court’s authority to issue such injunctions, the financial
markets tend to discount the securities of the reorganized debtor. This in turn diminishes the
trust’s assets and its resources to pay victims.”).
400. The first Johns-Manville trust was deemed insolvent just a few years after inception.
See DIXON ET AL., supra note 85, at 6.
401. As noted above, under my proposals, a corporate debtor seeking a channeling
injunction must be able to offer the court “reasonable assurance” that the resulting settlement
trust will not become prematurely insolvent. Debtors can certainly rely on the historical
financing constructs captured in §§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) and 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) to make the
necessary showing, but these features should not be a requirement.

